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SCHOOL NOTES.
We publish in this issue the admirable
address on the subject, " Glimpses of the
History of the Law, Suggestive to the
Young Lawyer of To-day," given before
the Law School on Friday evening, May
9th, by the Hon. .William Penn Lloyd,
Treasurer of the State Bar Association.
This is the first of a series of lectures to be
given under the auspices of the Historical
Society of the Dickinson School of Law.
The appropriateness of the theme to the
purpose in view, the scholarly and painstaking research of the lecturer, and the
value of the discourse to the student body,
will be appreciated by the reader, to whom
we have thought best to give the lecture
in full rather than a review.

A number of volumes of the National
ReporterSystem have been added to the
library since the last issue.
ALUMNI NOTES.
"Frederick D. Oiler, of Shamburg, well
known here, who has been reading law
with Hon. R. F. Glenn, of Franklin, has
been admitted to practice at the Venango
county bar. Mr. Oiler is bright, well educated, up to date, and will undoubtedly
make his mark as a lawyer."-Titusville
Courier. Mr. Oiler graduated In the class
of '99.
Charles E. Daniels, '98, of Scranton, was
a visitor during the month.

Fred. B. Gerber, of the Middle class, has
accepted the appointment as historian for
the Historical Society.

Samuel E. Basehore, '01, of Mechanicsburg, attended the lecture of Hon. Win.
Penn Lloyd, May 9th.

We regret to announce that ill health
has necessitated Vastine, of the Middle
class, to return home. We hope that he
may soon be restored to health and enabled
to resume the work of the school.

Robert H. Smith, '00, of Oakland, Cal.,
was in town during the month.
Robert Henderson, '94, was married recently.

THE FORUM

170
BOOK REVIEWS.

No. 151.

Acknowledged-Review will follow.
One volume.
VOID JUDICIAL SALES.
Fourthedition. By Ron. A. C. Freeman.
CentralLaw Journal Co., St. Louis, 1902.
Price,$4.00

No. 152.

The following is a continuation of the
Moot Court cases:
Plaintiff

Defendant

Williamson,
No. 136. Gross,
Vastine.
Welsh,
Cisney, J.
Jacobs, J. W.,
No. 137. James,
White.
Lloyd,
Keelor, J.
Gerber,
No. 138. Fox,
Peightel,
Myers.
McIntyre, J.
Osborne,
No. 139. Thorne,
Sterrett.
McIntyre,
Rhodes, J., J.
Chapman,
No. 140. Hugus,
Bradshaw.
Fleitz,
Sherbine, J.
No. 141. Knappenb'ger, Jacobs, J. H.,
Flynn.
Albertson,
Fox, J.
Schanz,
No. 142. Claycomb,
Drumheller.
Wright,
Kaufman, J.
Matthews,
No. 143. Hillyer,
Wilson.
Miller,
Gross, J.
Cooper,
No. 144. Schnee,
Hickernell.
Kaufman,
Longbottom, J.
Elmes,
No. 145. Boryer,
Conry.
Houser,
Thorne, J.
Donahoe,
No. 146. Delaney,
Longbottom.
Cisney,
Minnich, J.
Ebbert,
No. 147. (rary,
Keelor.
Miller,
Dively,
No. 148. Yocum,
Cook.
Oldt,
Williamson, J.
Hubler,
No. 149. Benjamin,
Berkhouse.
Schiffer,
Schanz, J.
Brundage,
No. 150. Carlin,
Lanard.
Lourimer,
Gerber, J.

A

Jones,
Hamblin.
Miller, J.
Gerber,
Brennan,
Dever,
Sherbine.
Vastine, J.
Kline,
Mays,

GLIMPSE AT THE HISTORY OF
THE LAW, SUGGESTIVE TO THE
YOUNG LAWYER OF TO-DAY.
By HON. WILLIAM PENN LLOYD.

To the young lawyer it is of the first
importance that he should have an intelligent conception of the dignity and honor
of his profession, a conception that, as it
deepens and broadens with time, shall become the inspiration of his life work.
There is no richer field in which to nurture and cultivate the worthy ambition
that has led him to choose this exalted
calling, than the History of the Law.
From the time when its infant foot-steps
ventured to lead the march of human
progress, law has stood first among all the
branches of study in training the reason
and developing the judgment of mankind.
It now stands as one of the proudest
monuments of intellectual achievement,
and flashes from its majestic proportions,
as its In Hoc Signo Vinces, that, " Law is
the very reason of the thing, and that
which is not reason is not law."
The first historical glimpse of law, resting on this foundation, is the Decalogue,
including the Mosaic legislation. Grotius,
Blackstone, and other eminent writers on
law maintain that this was the Genesis of
all human law. A very old code it is indeed; but wherever the race has emerged
from the night of barbarism, and in its upward struggles has reached a plane of comparative security and justice, the principles of this ancient code are found to have
inspired the laws that accomplished that
result. Take from the splendid jurisprudence of this present age of highest civilization, the immortal principles ofjustice
and equity, of the brotherhood of mankind, and of the austere obligations of
right, which make lustrous the pages of
divine revelation, and there would be
little left worth preserving.
The Greeks, with all their genius, their
creation in literature, philosophy and art,
did little for civilization, which we can
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trace in the science ofjurisprudence. They
were too speculative for such a practical
subject as law. But this speculative wisdom was made use of by the stern Roman
jurist, so far as philosophy modified law.
Yet Roman jurisprudence did not culminate in its serene, majesty until the time
of the emperors.
Justiniani then consolidated it in the
Code, the Pandects, and the Institutes.
The earliest legislation worthy of notice
was the celebrated code called the "Twelve
Tables. " But scarcely any part of the
Civil Law as we now know it, contained
in the Twelve Tables, has come down to
us. The Code, Pandects, Institutes and
Novels of Justinian, comprise the Roman
Law, as received in the form given by the
School of Bologna, that became the Common Law ot Europe.
The Golden Age of Roman jurisprudence was from the birth of Cicero to the
reign of Alexander Severus. Before this
period, it was an occult science, confined
exclusively to praetors, pontiffs and patrician lawyers. But as Law has always
flourished where the people had a voice in
the governmert, in the latter days of the
Republic, law became the fashionable
study of the Roman youths, and consequently eminent masters rose. Among
these masters were Varus, Cato, Casar,
Anthony and Cicero.
These great lawyers, and many others
that might be named if time would permit, have shed a grander glory and more
enduring benefits upon mankind than all
the victories won by the embattled phalanx of that warrior people. Candidates
for the bar studied four years under distinguished jurists, and were required to
pass a rigorous examination. The judges
were chosen from the members of the bar,
and the great lawyers were not only
learned in the law, but possessed all the
other accomplishments that the literature
of the day could supply.
To Justinian belongs the immortal
glory of reforming the jurisprudence of
the Romans. " In the space of ten centuries," says Gibbon, "the infinite variety
of laws and legal opinions had filled many
thousand volumes, which in those days of
high priced books or manuscript scrolls,
no fortune could purchase, and no capacity could digest." Justinian deter-
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mined to unite in one body all the laws,
whatever may have been their origin. He
called to his aid ten celebrated Jurisconsuits, or judges, and in fourteen months
accomplished his stupendous task, a task
for which all future ages should accord
him highest honor. Justice Story, in
his address delivered, October 15, 1835, on
the character and services of Chief Justice
Marshall, says that, "The fame of
Justinian as a fortunate possessor of the
imperial purple would have long since
faded into an almost evanescent point in
history, if his memorable Codes of jurisprudence had not secured him an enviable
immortality by the instructions they have
imparted to the civilization of all succeeding times."
Have we not here a striking illustration
of the fact that history repeats itself?
The reports of cases adjudicated by our
National and State Courts are falling from
the press like a shower of meteors from a
November sky. They are multiplying by
the thousands so rapidly that one forbears
to mention the number. But history will
here also repeat itself. Some Justinian
will happen along one of these auspicious
days, and he is as likely to come from the
recruits that the Dickinson School of Law
is furnishing to our profession, as from
any other similar institution in the land.
But this brief historical sketch must be
condensed still further.
The eight hundred years of the "Dark
Ages, " when at the fall of the Roman
Empire, the night of barbarism had again
settled down upon the world, and all the
civilization of preceding centuries seemed
to have been submerged by the glacier of
northern conquest that swept down upon
Southern Europe,-Law, with all other
achievements of mind, appeared to be
buried in the gulf of oblivion. These long
weary centuries seemed to sleep the sleep
that knows no waking. But this was not
SO.

The seed sown by the noble pioneers of
our profession, like the golden grain encased in the mummies of Egypt was still
redolent of life, and readily burst forth in
rich harvests for the future, when conditions favored its growth. Those conditions matured early in the fifteenth century. From that period forward the steady
march of the law, clothed with its majesty
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and power, has met no foe of sufficient
strength to permanently arrest its triumphant progress.
Those Northern
Hordes, as they are'sometimes called in
history, among which were our Frankcon,
German, Angles and Saxon forefathers,
while rude, fierce and sometimes mercenary, yet brave and manly, had caught
from the very air they breathed in their
Northern forest homes, a true, though
crude conception of human liberty and
justice.
This, of course, took long years to formulate into the enlightened ethical Code,
and rich inheritance of the common law
that we, their children, now enjoy.
The trial by jury, that Paladium of
Human liberty, at least in criminal prosecutions, in its slow development to its
present, though not yet perfect system,
strikingly illustrates this truth. While
its origin is clouded by uncertainties
that blistory has thus far been unable to
solve, yet the fact of its existence attests
the supreme majesty of the innate principles of justice, which animate the humane
in man, and this more and more, as his
conception of liberty regulated by law,
broadened in the upward trend of civilization.
This boon to the human race does not
owe its existence to any positive law. It
is not the creation of any legislative body.
Some attribute it to Alfred the Great, on
the idea that it was one of the legacies
bequeathed to us by our Anglo-Saxon ancestors; but others say that its origin is
lost in the night of time.
Whether the English jury is of indigenous growth, or has been borrowed from
some earlier age, may be a question that
can not now be satisfactorily determined,
yet the potent fact still remains, that, without the nurturing care and protection of the
lawyers of the past, it would not now be
shedding its rich benedictions on our land.
There are some who, seeing an occasional
failure ofjustice, jump to the conclusion
that the jury should be altogether abolished, yet such eminent jurists as Mr.
Justice Brewer, of the United States Supreme Court, while noting imperfections
in our present system that should be remedied, yet vigorously upholds it in a recent
able article in the International Monthly.
The origin of the Common Law is also

wrapped in obscurity. The dim cluster of
thirteen stars, representing the thirteen
feeble colonies which achieved our Independence, but which has now grown into
a brilliant constellation of forty-five great
Republics, forming a mighty nation,
"Distinct as the billows but one as the
Sea," adopted the Common Law of England, so far as the wisdom of our forefathers deemed it applicable to our changed conditions, and this course has been continued
with us, until we have it in the modified
form we find it to-day.
This law was also then of venerable age,
and enduring growth. It was a system,
in the main, built upon the foundation of
Feudalism, with large material imported
from the Roman Codes-to which I have
referred-occasionally, perhaps, modified
by ancient Celtic, Saxon, Danish and
Norman Laws and customs.
When in English Legislation the Common Law has been formulated into statutory provisions, as also mainly with us,
the practical element has always predominated over the speculative.
"To think little of system and much of
convenience; never to remove an anomaly
merely because it is an anomaly; never to
innovate except when some grievance is
felt; never to lay down a proposition of
wider extent than the peculiar case for
which it is necessary to provide," these
says Macaulay-" are the rules which have
from the age of King John, from whom
the Magna Charts was wrung, down to
Victoria, generally guided the legislation
of England." The same is substantially
true of our State Legislatures and of our
National Congress.
Equity jurisprudence, modified to meet
the requirements of our State and Municipal systems, has also been mainly transplanted from the Mother soil of England.
"Equity," says a distinguished jurist,
"in its comprehensive acceptation, includes the whole circle of moral and civil
obligation, and is the end to the attainment
to which all laws should be directed."
Equity owes its origin to the immutable
principles contained in the Moral Law. It
is not, however, a superior power rising in
awing grandeur above the Common Law,
or above State or Municipal regulations,
without impediment or restraint, but
merely a subservient principle not called
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into action, until by reason of its universality, its superior is deficient. When,
therefore, the subject of a complaint is the
necessary and immediate result of a law
founded upon general principles, equity
can not arrest its progress; but when the
injury is collateral, so that it may fairly
be presumed to have been unforeseen by
the legislator, this beneficent power may
interfere for the advancement of justice.".
As the application of the principles of
equity by the Courts of Pennsylvania is
peculiar to this State, I shall ask your attention a little further on this point. That
there never has been a Court of Chancery,
answering or corresponding with the
Court of Chancery of England, in Pennsylvania; and that there never will be is
shown by the strong, popular feeling
against such a Court from the earliest
period of our Colonial existence. The year
1790 is the true point at which we must
fix the establishment of Pennsylvania's
jurisprudence; but all efforts, .both prior
and subsequent to that date, have failed
to establish a separate and distinct system
of Chancery or Equity jurisprudence.
Pennsylvania has, therefore, a mixed
system of the Common Law and Equity,
administered by the same tribunal. In
this regard our judiciary stands in the
forefront of opportunity to dispense as
equal and exact justice as can be done
through human agencies. Experience has
fully proven that equity and law can now
be concurrently administered by the same
judges; and that when a system of jurisprudence is founded upon rational principles, and free from useless niceties, there
is little more required to complete equity,
than a fair and correct interpretation of
the law itself. "There can be no possible
disadvantage in these modern times,"
says Anthony Laussatt, Jr., in an able
lecture delivered in 1825, "in expounding
the law by the rules of reason and natural
justice, and this is attained by the union
of the two powers in one tribunal. "
That we do not find in Pennsylvania
two distinct systems of jurisprudence,
known respectively as law and equity, determined by different tribunals and administered by different judges, is doubtlessly largely accounted for by the views
of our early settlers as to the object and
purposes of the law. In the laws agreed

upon in England, May 5, 1682, before William Penn set sail for America, it was provided, "That in all Courts, all persons of
all persuasions, may freely appear in their
own way and according to their own manner, and there personally plead their own
case themselves, or, if unable, by their
friends; and that all pleadings, processes
and records in the Courts shall be short,
and in English, and in an ordinary and
plain character, that they may be understood and justice be speedily administered."
Truly here every man might be his own
lawyer and, doubtlessly, also to his own
discomfiture. Yet from this unwinnowed,
but pure seed of the Golden Rule has
sprung.the rugged, majestic trunk, and
wide-spreading and fruitful branches of
the royal oak that now stands as the jurisprudence of the Keystone State. While
claiming no pre-eminence in this regard,
Pennsylvania feels that she shares equal
honors with her sister States, as one of
the ".B Pluribus Unum," whose canopy
is luminous with as pure a judicial lustre,
and as brilliant stars among its lawyers,
as has ever shed its light upon the world.
While I might here interpose as a plea
of " Confession and avoidance, " the fact
that this is a Historical Society, to the
complaint that history has already received more than its share of the time allotted to me, yet I will endeavor to merit
equity by doing equity, and confine my
remaining remarks to "The young lawyer of to-day."
A brief comparison of our profession and
our Courts of forty years ago with those of
to-day may not be devoid of interest and
instruction. C. Larue Munson, of Lycoming county, one of the distinguished
lawyers of our State, in a lecture delivered
before the York Bar Association, on John
Marshall Day, February 4, 1901, thus
graphically states this comparison. "Let
us consider for a moment how differently
we do our work now, than we did in the
seventies. Then, for example, our correspondence was done wholly with the pen.
Now we call our stenographer or expert
typewriter to our elbow and he-more frequently she, for the average lawyer is a
man of good taste-relieves us of the physical labor of committing our correspondence to paper, requiring us only to append
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we will say is 1870, Jones vs. Sinith is on
trial. The cause has been duly opened
and a witness called to the stand, the
only record we can have of his evidence,
indeed of all the oral testimony, being
that furnished by the Judge's notes-a
task as irksome to the bench as its results
must have been unsatisfactory to the Bar.
A witness is asked a question, objectional
to the other side. "Make your offer," is
the demand. Now-a-days it is a mere
matter of dictation, both in the offer and
in the objection ; then the attorneys for
Jones must put their heads together and
evolve a long offer, committing it to the
so-called writing-imagine the time required in the operation-and, when finished, pass it over to the counsel for
Smith, who prepare their objections, also
in writing, consuming no little time,
until at lat the thing looking to the unpracticed eye almost as illegible as hieroglyphics of Egypt, is literdlly "up to" the
court where it receives adjudication, in
formal style, and thereupon a bill is actuuse our client's twelve swine, sheep,
ally sealed/ How rare a bird is that old
horses, cows, calves or other cattle, on any
"bill sealed "? in these modern days of
old date, but also, always, to wit :-at the
tongue and stenographer?
The fiction
County aforesaid. No more do we need to
observe the fine distinction between tres- remains but the fact is gone."
How different is all this now, and is it
pass, and trespass on the case, no longer
an unwarranted stretch of the imaginaare we obliged to brush up our Latin
tion to assume that as striking a contrast
against quare clausam fregit, trespass de
bonis asportatis,and trespass vi et armis. may exist between the present conditions
All we need to do is to -decide whether it is and those of as many years hence?
for debt or injury that we seek to recover,
The young lawyer of to-day must equip
and so we write assumpsit or trespass in
himself to meet these sweeping advanceour praecipe and get at the substance of
ments, but this should not discourage
our case, assured that it will be tried on
him. By diligent effort in appropriating
its merits, and not on our abilities as
the superior advantages presented to him
special pleaders.
he will not prove himself an unworthy
son of a worthy sire. There is no calling
In the means of access of the lawyer to
in which the truth that every man is the
his client and his affairs, how vast a
architect of his own fortune, is more strikchange. The present rapid mail serviee,
ingly exemplified than in the profession of
the telegraph, and the telephone have reduced the time required for transactions
the law. This profession now covers the
whole rapidly broadening field of human
from weeks formerly, now often to the
fraction of a day or even an hour. 'This activities, and exacts a studied familiarity
with all its varied requirements. If, thereenables one to transact more business with
less worrying delay, and affords him larger
fore, the young lawyer would attain a full
measure of success he must strive to reach
opportunities for preparation to do it well.
Passing into the Court room, we find
the front rank of mental athletes. If,
however, he depends upon brilliancy
improvements there, although not so
marked as in our offices. How much the
alone, he will in the end, find himself
stenographer has also improved the man- outstripped by perhaps less talent, but
ner of the trial of causes, only a comparmore severe application, careful preparaison with other days will show. The date
tion and practical common sense. Work
our names, often translatable only by the
business card at the head of the sheet.
Formerly we wrote out all our legal documents, a most laborous task, nQw we accomplish the work by dictation, and are
able to deliver our clients legible copies of
their agreements, with as many duplicates,
by carbon, as may be desired.
Compare us also with the old lawyers
who prepared their pleadings under the
eye of Chitty, now lying dust covered and
forgotten on our top-most shelves, while
we make a statement, "As a tale that is
told," without fear of defeat for want of
phrase or technical terms.
No longer do we declare in assumpsit
upon the common count-most meaningless language; no more do we declare in
trover and conversion that our unfortunate and careless client casually (mark
the word) lost, the defendant alike by
mere chance found, and then led on by
the demon, forgetful of Commandments
eight and nine, wickedly converted to his
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now as it always has been, is the talisman
of success; and as George F. Baer, President of the Philadelphia and Reading
Railroad Company, in his recent admirable lecture before Franklin and Afarshall
College, declares, is-Worship. This is true,
at least in the sense, that he who worships
work will be rewarded.
Hume says,
"Everything in this world has been purchased by labor."
Law is, without question, one of the
most sternly exacting professions of our
day, and the young lawyer who was
"born tired" will soon discover that he
has mistaken his calling. These may
seem harsh facts, but frank statements
are always the best, and I believe when
you, gentlemen, chose your honorable profession, you did it with no thought that
you would be "carried to the skies on
flowery beds of ease, but that you must
fight to win the prize."
You, who with
courage and resolution adopt this motto,
will win as surely as did those of our profession who have preceded you. The
changed conditions which we have noted
admonish us that it may not be on the
same lines, but it will. nevertheless, be a
success worthy of your best efforts.
The former enviable position of the lawyer as a brilliant advocate has changed in
this severely realistic age to that of the
counsellor and adviser. How would the
ornamental rhetoric and grand flights of
eloquence of even a Curran, an Erskine,
or a Burke, or here with us, of a Henry, a
Wirt, or a Prentiss, sound in our district,
much less our Appellate Courts, State and
National?
Even our jurors prefer the cold facts
clearly stated, to a bewildering muddle,
however richly perfumed with the aroma
of eloquence.
To this austere and practical age, every
interest, business and profession, must
bow. This is not stated to discourage the
young lawyer, but to inspire him in his efforts to acquire the highest attainments
in all that enriches his native tongue and
gives clearness and brevity to his statements. His carefully prepared brief
which will enable the Judge to follow his
argument without having his attention
distracted by taking notes of a mixed and
obscure statement, will do much to get his
case clearly and f-ircibly before the court.

The day of quirks and quibbles before
our courts, and the pettifoggery play with
our juries, is rapidly passing away. It is
the law, clearly, logically and succinctly
stated, without appeal to passion or prejudice, that our courts want; and the lawyer
who attempts to play upon the credulity
of our average juries by discounting their
intelligence, will generally find, if possessed with an ordinary degree of perception, that he has missed his mark. But,
above all, the success of the young lawyer
of to-day must depend mainly on the confidence imposed in his ability and integrity
by his clientage. The glamour of legal
acrobats counts for very little now.
Every man, whatever be his calling, is
more clearly and accurately measured for
whathe is wdrth now than ever before.
Sham pretentions and flattering professions win little, and will win less in the
near future. The wrecks that already
strew the bars of our profession attest this
truth. This potent fact has so aroused the
attention of our profession, that it is taking a firm grasp upon it.
The marvelous increase of the organization of State and district lawyers' associations during the last ten years evidence
the earnest purpose of the profession in its
work for ethical and law reform. To-day
forty-one of our forty-five States have bar
associations, and there are more than two
hundred and fifty local or county associations. Some of these last may not yet
fully comprehend the real purpose of these
organizations, but they will early learn
that their sole object is to dignify and
exalt our profession, and thereby secure
the confidence of the public, and is not to
conceal or palliate the offenses of discredited members of it. That this sentiment
is also takingstrong hold, not only in these
associations, but in the profession generally, is demonstrated by the adoption of
higher standards for admission, and especially, by the numerous disbarments of
unworthy members of the profession that
have recently occurred in our own and
other States of the Union.
The following preamble adopted by the
Pennsylvania Bar Association, and with
slight change of phraseology, by the National and all the other State Associations,
indicates their high purpose. "Section ].
This Association is formed to advance
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the science of jurisprudence; to promote

labors on this edifice with usefulness and

the administration of justice; to secure
proper legislation ;
to encourage
a
thorough legal education; to uphold the
honor and dignity of the bar; to cultivate
cordial intercourse among the Lawyers
of Pennsylvania; and to perpetuate the
history of the profession and the memory
of its members. Section 2. It shall not
take any partisan, political action, nor endorse or recommend any person for any
official position."
It will be noted that there is nothing
here that savors of the spirit of sordid,
self-interest or commercialism; and the
honorable record these Associations have
already made, shows that their announced
purposes are not mere professions, but determined resolve to accomplish as far as
honest, persistent effort can, the work to
which they have pledged themselves.
All these purposes as set forth in the
above preamble, are assigned to committees composed of eminent members of the
profession, who, with rare earnestness,
give their best thought and most unstinted labors. The amount of work thus
done by these committees in the Pennsylvania Bar Association, during its short
history of seven years, is most surprising
-and all freely and faithfully done to advance the science of jurisprudence, promote the administration of justice, and
uphold the honor and dignity of the bar,
by exalting the Ethics of the profession.
Of the first of these, Edmund Burke declared that: "The science of jurisprudence is the pride of human intellect,
which, with all its defects, is the collected
reason of the ages, combining the principles of original justice with the infinite
variety of human concerns. That it is
one of the first and noblest of hunian
sciences, a science which does more to
quicken and invigorate the human understanding than all other kinds of human
learning."
Daniel Webster says of the second:
"Justice, sir, is the greatest interest of
man on earth.
It is the ligament which
holds civilized beings and civilized nations together.
Wherever her temple
stands, and so long as it is duly honored,
there is a foundation for social security,
general happiness and the improvement
and progress of the race. And whoever

distinction, whoever clears its foundation,
strengthens its pillars, and adorns its entablitures, or contributes to raise its august
dome still higher in the skies, connects
himself in name and fame and character,
with that which is, and must be, as durable as the frame of human society."
Of the third, Justice Sharswood bears
this testimony, that "there is no profession in which moral character is so fixed
as in the law; there is none in which it is
subject to severer scrutiny by the public."
It is well that it is so. The things we
hold dearest on earth-our fortunes, reputations, domestic peace, liberty, life-we
confide to the integrity of our legal counsellors and advocates. Their character,
then, should not only be without stain,
but without suspicion. From the start,
then, cultivate truth, simplicity and candor; they are the cardinal virtues of the
lawyer.
I have purposely quoted these three,
among the noblest masters of our professions, as thus giving to us the beatitudes
of the "Science of Law." Never in the
past history of the law, nor in any other
nation, have these truths, and especially
the last named-so eloquently stated by
Justice Sharswood-assumed so insistent
and commanding an influence ais with us
to-day. Vigilant, alert, and instant in action, our people jump to seize and utilize,
not only every new discovery or invention,
but also, with keenest discrimination, to
measure and reward moral worth and professional reliability according to their
merits. This fact has assumed a commanding potency, even aside from its
moral support, simply because the enlightened selfishness of our people has wisely
decided that it pays to follow its teachings, and that meritshould win becauseit
deserves to win.
The nations of Europe, astounded at the
marvelousmaterial,scientificand economic
development of our young nation, are
learning from those whom they have sent
here to discover the cause, that it is simply
the recognition of the manliness of mailthoroughly equipped to discharge the
duties assigned him, faithfully and efficiently-that has placed us in the front
rank of the world powers to-day.
With such an equipment theyoung law-
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yer, notwithstanding the pessimist's
gloomy lament that he was born a generation too late-with no other capital than
a trustworthy character, a well-trained
mind, bikoad intelligence and industrious
habits-a capacity for hard work, and an
ambition to get on in the world-starts in
the practice of his profession with as encouraging prospects of success as has ever
greeted the fathers of the past.

MOOT COURT.
SHANNON'S ESTATE.
Wills-Trustee and cestui que trust-imbarrassmentof trustee-iBight of one beneficiary to the benefit of additional security induced by other beneficidry before default of trustee.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE.
John Shannon by will, gave his personalty, $25,000, to Jacob Tritt, in trust to invest it, and pay the net dividends and
interest semi-annually, one-half to his
daughter, Jane Shannon, and one-half to
his son, James. At the death of either,
one-half of the principal was to be paid to
his or her children, or his or her legatees,
or, in default of children and will, to be
left invested and the dividends and interest paid to the survivor during life, and at
his or her death, to his or her children, or
legatees, or, in default of either, next of
kin. Two years after testator's death,
James thought it prudent to take security
from Tritt, and received from him a mortgage for $15,000, conditioned to be void if
Tritt should faithfully preserve one-half
of the fund in his possession, pay the interest, etc., to James during life, and at
his death, the principal to his children or
legatees. He gave to Tritt, as an inducement to give the mortgage, $250. Tritt
remained in good credit for 10 years, faithfully administering the property. He
then became embarrassed and used the
whole of the trust fund in his business,
and ultimately lost all. This was 13 years
after the giving of the mortgage. James
Shannon then sued out the mortgage and
his sister, Jane, who had learned of it five
years before, filed a bill to compel James
to assign to her one-half of the mortgage,
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on her tendering $125 with interest from
the time of the payment to Tritt of $250.
The decree was entered.
THORNE and DEVER for the plaintiff.
ELMES and KEELOR for the defendant.
Community of interest produces cornmunity of duty; each of those interested
must be faithful to himself and equally as
well to all the others interested. He can
secure no advantage because he has found
something they do not know, or is in better position to protect himself. Advantages gained by one must inure to benefit
of all. Estate Susan E. Duplaine, 185 Pa.
332; Weaver v. Wible, 25 Pa. 270; Lloyd
v. Lynch, 28 Pa. 419; Gibson v. Winslow, 46
Pa. 380; Kennedy v. Borie, 166 Pa. 361;
Powell v. Lantzey, 173 Pa. 543 ; Aubert's
Appeal, 119 Pa. 52; Wilen's Appeal, 105
Pa. 121.
OPINION OF THE COURT.
It is believed that the decree of the
court below should be affirmed. The case
is similar to that of the Estate of Susan E.
Duplaine, 185 Pa. 332, where the court
said: "It has been settled that where
there is a community of interest there is a
community of duty, each of those interested must be faithful to himself and
equally as well to all the others interested."
It is true that the equities in this
case are not so overwhelmingly in favor
of the complainant as in Duplaine's Estate. There, the trustee was embarrassed
when the mortgage was secured from him;
here he was not. There, the brother for
several years concealed from his sister all
knowledge of tle mortgage he had secured,
and of the embarrassed condition of the
trustee; here, the sister learned of the
mortgage two years before the trustee became embarrassed and five years before he
lost the trust funds. There, no money
consideration appears to have been paid
for the mortgage; here, the brother paid
$250. Notwithstanding these differences,
however, we feel that in the case before
us, the brother's conduct was clearly inequitable. By taking the mortgage from
the trustee, he obtained a security which
his sister did not possess. She might also
have requested a mortgage, but there is no
evidence that the trustee would have
granted her request. Moreover, it does
not appear that he was the owner of property other than that mortgaged to the
brother, so that a mortgage to the sister
would probably have been a second lien,
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and perhaps of no value, whatever. In
short, the brother deliberately placed himself in a position distinctly superior to that
of his co-beneficiary. Under the authority
of Duplaine's Estate, supra; Weaver v.
Wible, 25 Pa. 270; Lloyd v. Lynch, 28 Pa.
419; Gibson v. Winslow, 46 Pa. 380 ; Kennedy v. Borie, 166 Pa. 360, and Powell v.
Lantzey, 173 Pa. 543, this cannot be tolerated. It is repugnant to the sense of
justice and a violation of the duty ofjoint
beneficiaries to deal fairly and openly with
each other.
The complainant is not chargeable with
laches, as the rights of no one were prejudiced by the delay.
Decree affirmed, with costs.
NAPLES vs. NAPLES.
Taxes- Unseated lands-A lien on land.Not a personal liabdlity-Life tenant.Remaindermen.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE.

In the partition of John Naples' estate,
unimproved and unseated land was allotted to Sarah Naples for life as dower.
She received for life also, the mansion
house in town, the rental of which was
$120 annually. Her step-son paid the
taxes accrued on the unseated land for
four years, in order to avoid a sale. He
brings this suit for reimbursement.
BROOKS and MCKEEHAN for plaintiff.
A life tenant is bound to pay taxes in
exoneration of those entitled in remainder. Estate of Schurr, 13 Phila. 353;
McDonald v. Heylin, 4 Phila. 73; Jewell's
Estate, I W. N. C. 405; Foger v. Campbell, 5 Watts 288.
MooN and OSBORNE for defendant.
Unseated lands are alone liable for taxes
assessed thereon ; there is no personal
liability upon the owner thereof. Hunter
v. Cochran, 3 Pa. 107; Kennedy v. Daily,
6 Watts 272; Neill v. Lacy, 110 Pa. 294.
OPINION OF THE COURT.

This is an action of assumpsit by John
Naples against his step-mother, Sarah
Naples, to recover the amount of certaiii
taxes paid by him on unimproved and
unseated lands allotted to her for life, as
dower. The taxes were paid by him in
order to prevent a sale of the property.
It cannot be denied that under all just
systems of taxation, he who presently enjoys the subject of the tax, ought to dis-

charge the present obligation. In recognition of this principle, Justice Bell in
Spangler v. York Co., 13 Pa. 327, held that,
"all our tax laws, without exception,
recognize the personal amenability of the
immediate beneficiary. "1
The tenant for life being in possession
and enjoyment of the property, it would
follow from the rule as laid down in the
cases, that he or she is bound to pay the
taxes in exoneration of the remainderman
and that estate should be first called upon
and exhausted. Estate of Schurr, 13
Phila. 353; McDonald v. Heylin, 4 Phila.
73.
John Naples must have had some interest in the land held by his step-mother for
life, which should be protected, for we can
see no reason for his payment of the taxes
to save the property from sale. This interest, as we can gather it from the statement of facts, is a remainder. Men generally are adverse to paying the debts of
others.
It is a clearly established principle that
no a~sumpsit will be raised by the mere
voluntary payment of the debt of another
person ; from such act a request and
promise are not implied. It is equally
true that when the plaintiff is compelled
to pay the defendant's debt in consequence of this omission so to do, the law
infers that he requested the plaintiff to
make payment for him. King v. Mt.
Vernon Building Association, 106 Pa. 165;
Hogg v. Longstreth, 97 Pa. 255 ; Bank v.
Shoemaker, 13 W. N. C. 255.
From the facts in the case Sarah Naples,
the life tenant, is primarily liable for the
taxes assessed on the land allotted to her,
unless the additional fact, that the lands
thus held were " unimproved and unseated" changed this liability.
A distinction has been drawn in this
state with reference to seated and unseated lands so far as the liability of the
owner for taxes is concerned. The well
recognized rule in Pennsylvania is that
taxes on seated lands are a charge upon
the land merely. Stokely v. Boner, 10 S.
& R. 256; Kennedy v. Daly, 6 Watts 273;
Hunter v. Cochran, 3 Pa. 107.
The Act of Assembly of April 3, 1804,
provides: "All unseated lands within
this Commonwealth * * * * * * * shall
for the purpose of raising county rates and
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levies be valued and assessed in the same
manner as other property. " The act also
provides for the sale of unseated lands in
default of taxes, which sale shall vest in
the purchaser a fee simple.
The land itself and not the owner being
debtor for the taxes, it is immaterial what
may be the state of the ownership or how
many derivative interests may have been
carved out of it. With these the public
has no concern ; they are sold with the
land just as a remainder would be sold
with the particular estate. Foger v. Campbell, 5 Watts 288 ; Stranch v. Shoemaker,
1 S. & R. 175.
Although a sale of this land for the nonpayment of the taxes would doubtless divest the plaintiff of his interest therein as
remninderman, yet to allow him to pay
the taxes anI recover in this action the
amount of money thus expended would
be compelling the life tenans to pay indirectly what she has neglected or absolutely
refused to pay, and for which, according to
the decisions, she is not liable personallythe remedy being in all cases the sale of
the unseated lauds by the authorities.
If we allow a recovery for the remainderman, compelling her to pay the taxes
during the whole of the life tenancy, if
she continues to hold the land, refuses to
pay the necessary charges and he institutes no proceedings to dispossess her, but
decides to pay the charges and resort to
his assumpsit to recover such expenditures. This we think would be not only
inequitable, but contrary to the decisions
relative to the liability of the owner for
taxes on unseated lands.
The principle that when one is compelled to pay another's debt in consequence of his failure so to do, the law will
infer that he requested such payment, is
not Applicable to this case. This is no
personal debt, but on the contrary is a
charge upon the land for the satisfaction
of which the statute authorizes a sale.
The presumption that she requested the
payment of a debt for which she was not
primarily liable is unwarranted or supported by the facts.
Judgment is therefore entered for the
defendant.
DAVIS, J.
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OPINION OF THE SUPREME COURT.

By the proceedings in partition Mrs.
Naples, as dowress, became life tenant of
the land. Unseated land may be taxed,
and the tax becomes a lien upon it. Indeed it alone, call be resorted to, for the
purpose of compelling payment. The
owner is not compellable by attachment
or imprisonment, or by levy and sale of
any other property, real or personal,
which he may have. The owner of unseated land therefore, can choose either to
pay the taxes and retain the land, or to
forego the land and avoid paying thetaxes.
Mrs. Naples, if owner in fee, could unquestionably have done this. She is only
a life tenant however, and her step-son,
son of her husband by a former marriage,
is the reversioner. What we have to consider is did the fact that she had only a
partial estate in the land, the step-son
having the residue, impose on her towards
him the duty of paying the tax?
When tax is assessed on unseated land,
it is assessed not on partial interests,
but on all interests which, combined.
make a fee simple in possession, or, as it is
said, it is assessed on the laud; and when
a sale for non-payment of the tax takes
place, it is a sale of the land, i. e. of the
fee simple in it; of all the partial interests into which that fee may happen to
have been broken. From this it results
that if the reversioner wants to save his
estate, he must pay the taxes, though
they are assessed during the life estate, if
the life tenant omits to pay them.
In the case of seated land, the life tenant is under a personal duty to the state to
pay the taxes, and there may be a lien on
the land besides. This duty exists, not
simply towards the state, but also towards
the reversioner or remainderman. If it is
neglected, the latter on paying the tax is
entitled to reimbursement from the life
tenant by assumpsit. II P. & L. Dig.
18701; Cf. Spangler v. York Co., 13 Pa.
322; Deraismes v. Deraismes, 72 N. Y.
154 ; 25 Am. & Eng. Encyc. 281 ; King v.
lt. Vernon Building Association, 108 Pa.
165.
When there is a personal liability to
pay the tax, the reversioner who pays it
may claim reimbursement from the life
Or,
tenant by a species of subrogation.
as some of the cases postulate, the life ten-
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ant owes a duty to thereversioner because
of the transfer to him of a burden which
the former ought to have borne.
There are two reasons, however, why,
in our opinion, the defendant cannot be
made to reimburse the plaintiff. She is
life tenant as dowress. The land is unseated. It is not resided on, nor cultivated. There is no evidence that there
are opened mines on it, which she has a
right to operate, nor that there is timber
on it, which she has a right to take off
and sell. It does not appear that she has
derived or could have derived any profit
from it. Following the authority of Clark
v. Middlesworth, 82 Ind. 240, we think a
life tenant under such circumstances, not
bound to pay the taxes, or to reimburse
the reversioner who does pay them. He
has a right to let the state take his land if
in his opinion it will pay him better to
lose it, than to retain it and pay the taxes
assessed annually upon it. Theburden of
showing that the land did yield or would
yield enough to pay the taxes, is on the
plaintiff. Cf. Billings v. Billings, 135 Pa.
199.
We think again, that Mrs. Naples should
not be compelled to pay the taxes to John
Naples, because the state did not oblige
her to pay them, but gave her the option
to pay them or suffer a sale, and we see no
reason for depriving her of the option be.
cause, for his own advantage, John
Naples has chosen to pay them. She has
chosen to sacrifice her life estate; he has
chosen to preserve his reversion. The
mere fact that in doing so, he has also preserved her life estate should not give him
a right of indemnification from her, at
least until by continuing to exercise acts
of ownership over the land, she, in a way,
attempts to take advantage of his act.
Perhaps, should he take possession of the
land, and she attempt to dispossess him,
or should she otherwise claim the land,
she would give him a right of action, because she had, perhaps, availed herself of
the fruit of his payment. In the absence
of such appropriation to herself of its
fruits, we think she cannot be compelled
to repay him.
An effectual means to protect himself
would have been for John Naples to suffer a sale of the land, and to buy it himself, or allow another to buy it: and then

redeem it within the two years. Before
Sarah Naples could have reclaimed herlife
estate, she would have been obliged to repay his outlays. In such a case, she
would have sought an advantage from his
act, and it would be fair to hold her unable to obtain it except oil the condition
of reimbursing him. Cf. Billings v. Billings, 135 Pa. 199.
Judgment affirmed.
HULL vs. FARRELL.
Bondg-Hortgages-light to proceed on
bond when value of mortgage lessened.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE.

Hull loaned $1,000 to Samuel Farrell, son
of Thomas, taking a mortgage on his
house. Three months later, discontented
with his security, he applied to the defendant for more. Farrell then executed a
bond for $1,000. The mortgage and bond
were both payable one year from date.
Hull took no steps to collect them for five
years, and meantime a fire destroyed the
building so that the lot was worth only
$150. Offering to assign the bond and
mortgage to Thomas Farrell upon his paying his bond, Hull failed to obtain payment and brings this assumpsit.
WHITE and CisxrEY for the plaintiff.
The relation of Thos. Farrell was that of
surety, rather than guarantor. 49 Pa. 259.
Every bond imports a consideration. 11 S.
R. 107; 2S. & R. 202; 171 Pa. 632. Delay
did not preclude Hull's bringing suit. 8
S. & R. 110; 11 Sup. 413.
CARLIN

and J. H.

JAcoBs

for the de-

fendant.
The bond was neither a guaranty nor a
suretyship. Vale Elementary Law of Pa.
725-739. Hull was guilty of laches in not
seeking payment. Reigert v. White, 52
Pa. 438 ; Gilbert v. Henck, 30 Pa. 205.
OPINION OF THE COURT.

The decision of this case depends upon
whether or not Thomas Farrell, the defendant, was a guarantor or surety.
Hull loaned Samuel Farrell $1,000 for
which he received a mortgage on Farrell's
house as security. Subsequently Hull became dissatisfied with the security and
applied to defendant for more, whereupon
Farrell executed a bond of $1,000.
What are the distinguishing features of
a guarantor and surety? A guaranty is a
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collateral undertaking in writing to pay
the debt of another in case such other doei
not pay it. 1 W. & S. 203. A surety is an
original undertaking in which the surety
is bound to the full extent of the principal's liability. A guarantor insures the
debt. A surety insures the solvency of
the debtor. 124 Pa. 58; 52 Pa. 525.
Let us compare the above statements
and thus arrive at the conclusions as to
whether Thomas Farrell was a guarantor
or surety. The bond in this case was collateral, because in "Bouvier" collateral
security is defined as "a separate obligation attached to another contract to guarA surety is
antee its performance. "
bound to the full extent of his principal's
business, He also insures the solvency of
the debtor. In the case at bar this was
not done. The defendant simply insured
this one debt of his son, not his solvency.
Hence we think that Thomas Farrell was
a guarantor.
What are Farrell's rights as such? In
the first place due diligence must be exercised by the creditor to collect the debt
from the principal. 52 Pa. 525; 2 W. 128;
31 Pa. 110; 30 Pa. 205; 5 Pa. 178. This
was not done by Hull but instead he allowed five years to elapse before he
brought this action. Secondly, the guarantor becomes liable on the guaranty as
soon as it is judicially settled that thedebt
cannot be collected. 100 Pa. 100; 27 Pa.
317 ; 30 Pa. 205 ; 25 Pa. 210. In this case
it has not been judicially settled that the
debt cannot be collected. Thirdly, the
plaintiff must have exhausted his remedy
upon the mortgage before he can sue upon
the guaranty. No action has been brought
upon the mortgage. Hence we think that
Samuel Farrell should pay instead of
Thomas. Judgment is therefore rendered
for the defendant.
MOON, J.
OPINION OF THE SUPREIM!E COURT.
Hull had loaned $1,000 to S. Farrell,
taking from him a bond and mortgage on
a house as security, which were payable
one year after date. Thomas Farrell,
three months afterwards, executed to Hull
a bond for $1,000. This bond was absolute, making no reference to the debt of S.
Farrell. It was nevertheless intended by
its maker and by the obligee, to secure the
payment of the S. Farrell bond.
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There does not seem to have been a consideration for this bond. No new credit
was given by Hull. He agreed to no prorogation of the payment. The seal however,dispenses with a consideration. Union
B. & L. Ass'n v. Hull, 135 Pa. 565; Hosler
v. Hursh, 151 Pa. 415.
The bond, we have said, makes no reference to the S. Farrell bond.. It is not a
guaranty. It is not to be paid, if S. Farrell should not pay, and if prompt resort
being had to him, he should be insolvent.
Thomas Farrell declares himself unconditionally bound to pay $1,000 on the day
mentioned. Had it even been payable, if
the S. Farrell bond should not be paid, it
would not be a guaranty, but a suretyship.
Campbell v. Sherman, 151 Pa. 70; McBeth v. Newlin, 15 W. N. 129.
It was not necessary for Hull to proceed
against S. Farrell within a reasonable
time, and the lapse of five years without
action, during which a fire has materially
lessened the value of the mortgage, has
not impaired Hull's right to enforce the
payment of $1,000 from the defendant.
Campbell v. Sherman, 151 Pa. 70; Searight's Estate, 163 Pa. 210; Commonwealth v. Degitz, 167 Pa. 400; Winton v.
Little, 94 Pa. 64 ; Kind's Appeal, 102 Pa.
441; McCarty v. Gordon, 4 Wh. 321.
It is to be regretted that the case has
been considered by the learned court below with so little desire to understand it,
and so little effort to investigate the principles necessary for its solution.
Judgment reversed.
GOWAN vs. STANDARD WOOD CO.
Act of 1895-urvival of actions.
STATESEENT OF THE CASE.

One Thomas McGowan was employed
by the Standard Wood Co., of this place.
The employees went on a strike and the
manager of the Wood Company, having
redson to believe that McGowan was at
the head of a crowd whose intention was
to burn the factory, caused his arrest for
attempted arson. The fellow waived a
hearing and went to jail. At the term of
court, not having sufficient evidence to
convict and the strike being over, the
company acquiesced in a nolpros., paid the
costs and the defendant discharged. The
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defendant then brings suit for $10,000 damages for false arrest and malicious prosecution against F. H. Lepscb, manager of
the Wood Company.
During the pending of the suit McGowan, plaintiff, died. The defendant
company filed a plea in abatement suggesting death of plaintiff. Counsel for
plaintiff asks that personal representatives of deceased be substituted as plaintiffs and proceed to final judgment. It
was placed on the argument list and
argued.
MILLER and LONG13OTTOM for the plaintiff.
The right of action survives to the personal representatives. Act of June 24, 1895.
If in the performance and within the
apparent scope of his duties, the agent of
any corporation inflicts unwarranted injury upon another the principal is liable.
Vol. 7, Am. & Eng. Ency. of Law, 684and
cases there cited.
WATSON for the defendant.
Act of 1895 does not apply, since the injury was not caused by negligence or default.
Injury must be caused by negligence or
wrongful violence. 33 Pa. 318 ; 40 Pa. 97;
44 Pa. 175; 23 Pa. 526.
OPINION OF THE COURT.
It was a principle of the common law
that if an injury was done to the person
or property of another for which damages
only could be recovered in satisfaction,
the action died with the person. Actio
personalis moritur cum persona. This
rule, that the action died with the person,
to whom or for whom the wrong was done,
was calculated to do an injustice, and we
find the same gradually relaxed. For
where goods remained in specie, it was
decided that replevin or detinue would lie
for or against the executor, to recover
back the specific goods, Sir William
Jones 173, 174. If goods were consumed
it was ruled that an action would lie to
recover their value.
In these decisions
the principle is recognized that there was
not only an injury to the plaintiff, but a
benefit to the defendant.
The principle, however, was still recognized that if the action be for a wrong
done to the person, it died with the person. Hence at the common law this
action for "false arrest" and "malicious
prosecution" being a wrong done to the
person, though grievous in its nature,
would not have survived.

It is evident then that if this action survives, it survives by virtue of an Act of Assembly. And we are therefore obliged to
consider the construction placed upon the
statutes in regards to the survival of
actions.
By the 28th section of the Act of February 24, 1834, relating to decedent's estates,
power is given to personal representatives
to prosecute all actions which the decedent, whom they represent, might have
prosecuted, "except actions for slander,
for libels and for wrongs done to the person" and by the last clause of this section,
"they shall be liable to be sued in any
action, except as aforesaid, which might
have been maintained against such decedent, if he had lived. " At common law
this cause of action would have died with
the defendant and since it is a wrong done
to the person, it dies notwithstanding the
Act of 1834 Supra. Grim v. Carr's Administrators, 31 Pa. 533.
The Act of April 15, 1851, P. L. 669 19,
provides that "Whenever death shall be
occasioned by unlawful violence or negligence, and no suit for damages bebrought
by the party injured during his or her
life, the widow of such deceased, or if
there be no widow, the personal representatives may maintain an action and recover damages for the death thus occasioned," and the 18th section of the same
act provides that when an action is begun
by the party injured, by the negligence of
the defendant, the same shall not abate
by reason of the plaintiff's death; "but
the personal representatives of the decedent may be substituted as plaintiff, and
prosecute the suit to final judgment. " '
The Act of April 26, 18-55, P. L. 309, section 1, merely designated the persons entitled to recover under the Act of 1851.
Thus it will be seen that the Act of 1834
Supra, was changed by the Act of 1851, so
far as to allow the widow and personal
representatives of a decedent to sue for injuries to the person, resulting in death,
from unlawful violence or negligence, but
it goes no further. The right, therefore,
to bring an action in case of wrongs done
to the person, arises by virtue of the Act
of Assembly; the right did not exist at
common law; hence no rights arise except those expressly given by statute. The
only exception, as to wrongs done to the
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person, being death caused by unlawful
negligence or violence, we cannot see our
way clear to extend it to mean any wrong
done to the person, not caused by negligence or violence, and not resulting in
death.
Under the Act of 1851 and 1855 Supra,
the cause of the action for wrongs done to
the person by unlawful negligence or violence survived, but not the liability.
Therefore under those acts no action could
be maintained against the personal representative of the wrong-doer. Rosanna F.
Moe v. T. J. Smiley, 12.5 Pa. 136. The liability of the action abated with the death
of the wrong-doer. The Act of June 24,
1895, P. L. 236, section 1, provides that the
liability of the action shall survive the
death of the wrong-doer. In the case at
bar, we are dealing with the cause of the
action, and therefore the Act of 1895 does
not apply as contended by the plaintiff.
We are therefore of the opinion, sin'ce
this action did not survive under the principles of the common law, and since it
does not fall within the exceptions provided by statute, that the action abated
with the death of the plaintiff.
Judgment for defendant.
SHERBINE, J.
OPINION OF THE SUPREME COURT.

The Act of 1834 provided for the survival of causes of action after the death of
the persop who suffered or inflicted a
wrong, except when the wrong was libel,
slander, or a wrong to the person. The
wrong done to a husband by criminal conversation with his wife, has been held to
be a wrong done to the person; the action
for which abates with the death of the
paramour. Clarke v. McClelland, 9 Pa.
128, and in Grim v. Carr's Admin., 31 Pa.
533, a man's deceiving a woman into marrying him, by representations that,
though in fact married, he was single,
was said to be a wrong to her person. "It
involved, "said Woodward, J., "theprostitution of her body, and the labor of her
hands, not to speak ot the shame and
grief it co3t her. These were all wrongs
done to her person and such causes of
action are not saved by the statute." The
court below correctly decided that the
wrong of a false arrest and malicious prosecution is a wrong to the person of the
arrested or prosecuted one.
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It is not suggested that any legislation,
later than the Act of 1834, has preserved
the right of action, after McGowan's
death, unless it be the Act of June 24,
1895, P. L. 236. The Act of April15, 1851,
1 P. & L. 1500, which refers to actions for
damages for injuries to the person, is limited 'to actions for such injuries as arise
from negligence or default. We do not
think the damage caused by an arrest and
a prosecution which are purposed, can be
described as arising by negligence or default, although it was a mistake or inadvertence, possibly involving negligence,
that inspired the arrest and prosecution.
The Act of 1895 provides for the survival of a right of action for an injury
" wrongfully done to the person of another," but only for such survival after
the death of the wrong-doer. It makesno
provision for survival after the death of
the sufferer of the injury. It is McGowan,
not Lepsch, who has died. The Act of
1895 has left the law, therefore, in this
peculiar state. The liability of the inflicter of a wrong to the person not negligent, or by default, or not resulting in
death, does not perish with his death, but
it does perish with the death'ofhis victim.
It is not likely that, had the legislature
been aware that they were making the'effeet of the death of the agent different
from that of the death of the patient, they
would have done so. They nevertheless
have done so, and it is not for us to rectify
the result of their lapsus.
Judgment affirmed.
HENRY vs. O'LEARY.
Slander- Words actionableper se -Damagesfor mental suffering.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE.

O'Leary had lent $25 to Henry, and
several weeks after it ought to have beein
returned, asked him for it. Henry superciliously declined to pay, whereupon,
O'Leary, in the presence of two persons,
told him, as Henry alleged, that he was a
thief for acting so. "No man would refuse to pay a sum of money borrowed if
he was not a thief." rThis is an action of
slander. Henry asked the court to say
that though the by-standers did not believe that O'Leary was intending to
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charge him with having stolen anything,
yet, if O'Leary intended that they should
so believe, he was guilty of slander.
He also asked an instruction that he
was entitled to compensation not merely
for injury to his reputation, but for the
wound to his own feelings sustained by
the malice of O'Leary in uttering the
words.
The court refused both requests.
PHILLIPs and WINGERT for the plaintiff.
"You are a thief; no one but a thief
would refuse to pay a sum of money borrowed" are words actionable per se. Kerr
v. Atticks, 22 Pa. C. C. R. 233; Todd v.
Rough, 10 S. & R. 18.
Where the charge implies moral turpitude, the element, danger- of punishment,
is not necessary. Smith v. Stewart, 5 Pa.
372.
Where words tend to take away a man's
good reputation, they are actionable. Eckert.v. Wilson, 10 S. & R. 44.

ironically or otherwise, and they do impute a crime; or if in consequence of other
words spoken at the same time, and if all
the words taken together do impute such
a crime, the court will so understand it
without the aid of averments and inuendoes, and will as a conclusion of law hold
the words actionable in themselves. When
the defendant has used only ordinary
English words, trial judge can determine
at once whether they are actionable or
not. The court below found the clause"
"No man would refuse to pay a sum of
money borrowed if he were not a thief, "
prima facie actionable, and in this there
was no error, as will be seen by a comparison with several authorities. In Stees
v. Rumble, 27 Pa. 112, we find these
words, "A man that would do that would
steal," these words are clearly notprima
facie actionable per se since the obvious
meaning is that under certain circumstances the defendant might steal, but
WATSON and WILLIS for the defendant.
the proposition does not say that he has
Since the words do not charge the plainstolen. In Kerr v. Atticks, 20 Pa. C. C.
tiff with having an infectious disease, or
charge an offence involving moral turpi335, the words charged are "Any one that
tude or tend to injure plaintiff in his of- would do that is a thief, " "that" referring
fice, profession, or trade, they are not acto some act done by the plaintiff. These
tionable per se. 53 Pa. 418; 2 W. & S.
words were held to be actionable per se.
408.
Mental suffering alone is no cause for
In determining whether the alleged words
action unlessspecial damage beshown. 126
in tho case at bar are actionableper se, we
Pa. 164; 147 Pa. 40; 63 Pa. 290.
must first determine the relation between
OPINION OF THE COURT.
the words in that case [20 Pa. C. C. 335]
and the one at bar. For the sake of conIt seems that O'Leary had loaned to
Henry the sum of $25. Several weeks af- venience we will contract the clause in the
case at bar to the form of (1) " No man
ter it ought to have been paid, O'Leary
would do that if he were not a thief,"
in a public manner asked H. for the sum
due. Upon being thus dunned, H. super- that, referring to "refusing to return a sum
This new proposiof money borrowed."
ciliously declined to pay. At this refusal
tion (1) we will compare with that stated
O'Leary became piqued and said "No man
in 20 Pa. 0. C. 335, which is (2) "Any
would refuse to pay a sum of money borTo
man that would do that is a thief."
rowed, if he were not a thief." As a result H. alleges that he had been called ht prove these propositions identical requires
thief. The transaction was in the pres- only the application of the simplest rules
of logic. Proposition (1) is a universal
ence of two witnesses only.
negative while (2) is a universal affirmaThere were two assignments of error to
tive, both are in the hypothetical form.
the proceedings before the court below,
Changing (1) to the specific or categorical
and both to the charge of the judge.
form we have " No case of a man's doing
In dealing with these exceptions it will
be necessary to consider the alleged de- that is the case of a man not being a
thief." By immediate inference from this
famatory clause and to determine how this
clause should be understood. It is a gen- last proposition we have "The case of a
man's doing that is the case of his being a
eral rule that the court will understand
thief." Now by changing this inferred
language as the rest of the world underproposition from the categorical to the
stands it, and when expressions assume a
hypothetical we have "Any man that
defa matory and slanderous, when spoken
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would do that isathief."

Bythisprocess

we have sholvu the two original propositions [(1) and (2) ] to be identical, and
therefore the words, "No man would refuse to pay a sum of money borrowed if he
were not a thief" is primafacie actionable.
Before deciding upon the first assignment of error it will be necessary to examine the nature of the last action for
slander. The action lies because one of
the absolute rights of the person has been
traversed. No man may disparage or destroy the reputation of another. The reputation of a man is that degree of esteem
in which he is held by his fellow men.
Words which defame his character and
lessen this esteem, with a few exceptions,
when made known to third parties constitute slander. Would, then, it not be possible for words charging a crime and
actionable per se to lie spoken under such,
that upon proof ofsuch circumstances, the
defendant would have an absolute defense?
For example, if spoken in a language unknown to hearers, or if the third parties
were all deaf. Would the case be changed
if all the hearers understood the language
and heard perfectly, but afterward testified that to their minds no crime was imputed? Upon examination of the books
we find this to be the law as interpreted
by a well adjudicated case in England,
and also similarly decided in a number of
the States. The first case of the kind is reported in 2 Car. & Kis. 440, Hankison v.
Belty. Here the words were "You are a
thief. You robbedMr. L. of36.", They
were spoken at a public toll gate whilethe
defendant was passing through There
was a number of witnesses, some of whom
testified that they knew that the words
did not impute a felony. The remaining
witnesses were not to be found or at least
were not called. In deciding the case it
was said, "If all' the hearers had so testified it would have been a perfect defense."
In North Carolina we find the same rule
adopted by the courts in Stoddard v.
Lowell, 3 Hawks 474. New York has also
established the rule in Kennedy v. Giffdrd, 19 Wend. 296.
This rule is undoubtedly founded upon
principle and we see no reason why it
should not be adopted by this court. We
therefore find no error in the charging of

the learned judge below. But according to
the weight of authority the converse of this
rule is not true and it does not follow that
words are actionable merely because they
were understood by those hearing them to
chargeacrime. [See Dixsonv. Stewart, 33
Iowa125]. Since the defendant is notguilty
of slander the question of damages is irrelevant, and it is therefore unnecessary tc
take up the second ground for a new trial.
New trial refused.
HADBLIN, J.
OPINION OF THE SUPERIOR COURT.

The first error urged against the judgment below is that the court refused, on
request, to tell the jury that, though the
bystanders did not believe that O'Leary
was intending to charge Henry with having stolen anything, yet, if O'Leary intended that they should so believe, he was
guilty of slander. Should the court have
given the instruction ?
(1). The words could not. reasonably
have been understood to impute theft to
Henry. Henry had just superciliously
declined to pay a debt. Thereupon O'Leary
told him that he was "a thief for acting
so ;" that "no man would refuse to pay a
sum of money borrowed if he was not a
thief." It distinctly appears from the
words and circumstances that O'Leury
was not charging that any theft had been
committed, save the refusal to pay a debt.
He was, in substance, saying that to refuse to pay a debt was to steal, and to steal
was to be a thief, or, that, in his opinion,
a man who refused to pay a debt was dishonest, and would steal, on occasion.
Under neither interpretation would the
words be actionable per se; not under the
first, because the words show what the act
attributed to Henry was, and that it was
not a theft; (f. 18 Am. & Eng. Encyc.
887, 888; not under the second, because to
express the opinion that one who, it is
alleged, has done one thing, would steal,
etc., is to imputea tendency, a willingness
to steal, and not a theft. Steese v. Kemble, 27 Pa. 112; 18 Am. & Eng. Encyc.,
890. If Kerr v. Atticks, 20 Pa. C. C. 233,
was intended to decide differently-as it
was not-we would not be able to follow it.
Since the words used do not bear the interpretation by which they would impute
a crime, the court properly refused to allow
the jury to say that they did impute.a
crime. Cf. Colbert v. Caldwell, 3 Gr. 181.
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(2.) But, even if the words might bear
the sense of imputing a crime, they are not
actionable, unless they in fact bore that
sense. But, to bear a sense does not mean
that the speaker intended in expressing
them to charge a crime, nor that he intended those who heard them to understand that he charged a crime. They
must in fact have understood that he intended to charge a crime. The essence of
the slander is the actual derogation from
the reputation of a man which springs
from the fact that another causes his
auditors to understand that he imputes an
improper act. Hence, when the words are
ambiguous, or in themselves unintelligible, resort can be had to the circumstances
under which they were uttered, as known
to the hearers, for the purpose of showing
what sense they would and did attach to
them. If the circumstances negative their
understanding the words in the slanderous
sense, or if it expressly appears that they
did not so understand them, no slander
has in fact been committed. Cf. Hankinson v. Bilby, 2 Carr & Kerivan, N. P. 439.
But, even if the utterer of the words
would be liable .for the sense that he intended them to bear, although that was
not the sense which his hearers supposed
him to intend, the court properly refused
to affirm the point, because there was no
evidence that O'Leary irrtended any other
sense than that which his hearers attached
to the words.
The second request for instructions whs
to the effect that the plaintiff was entitled
to compensation not merely for injury to
his reputation, but for the wound to his
ewn feelings occasioned by the malice of
O'Leary. On the theory that the animus
of the slanderer may itself cause pain to
the slandered, and that the pain is a
ground of compensation as well as the injury to reputation. 18 Am. & Eng. Encyc.
1083, some courts have allowed the jury to
consider the degree of express malice, in
appraising compensation. Faxon v. Jones,
176 Mass. 206. Inasmuch as there was no
slander proven for which any damage was
obtainable, no error was committed by the
court in refusing to say that damage was
allowable for its subjective consequences.
Nor should we think a sound policy justified a jury in giving damages to a man
who insolently refused to paya debt when

it was demanded, on the ground that disagreeable emotions had been awakened in
him by the somewhat too emphatic characterization of his conduct by the outraged
creditor.
Judgment affirmed.
KNOLL vs. ANTHON.
Liability of guarantor-Insolvency of
principal-Lachesof guarantee- When
discharged.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE.

On January 1, 1890, William Norris sold
to plaintiff, a judgment against Mary
Smith, which was payable one year after
date. Knoll, doubting the value of the
security, induced Morris to have his
friend Anthon protect him. Defendantgave a paper under seal in which lie
promised to pay the same at maturity in
case the money was not obtained from
Mary Smith. In January, 1891, Mary
Smith's property was sold by a prior lien
creditor, and nothing was paid to Knoll.
This action is brought, January, 1901, to
recover from Anthon for the loss sustained, $1,000, with interest from January
1, 1890.
PHILIPPS and WRIGHT for plaintiff.
Nothing but clear evidence of fraud or
mala fides can impeach the prima facie
title of a holder of negotiable paper taken
before maturity. Yard v. Patton. 13 Pa.
278, Marsh v. Marshall, 53 Pa. 396.
By virtue-of the instrument given by
Anthon being under seal, a consideration
is unnecessary. 7 Kulp 409, 135 Pa. 565.
YEAGLEY

and PEIGHTEL for defendant.

Laches, on the part of the creditor to
notify surety of the default of the principal will discharge the surety. De Colyer's
Law of Guarantees, p. 304; 2 Taunton 206.
The guarantor of a note will be discharged by a neglect of the holder to demand payment of the maker, and to give
the guarantor notice of non-payment, provided the maker was solvent when the
note became due and has since become insolvent. Oxford Bank v. Haynes, 8 Pick.
423, Cannon v. Gibbs, 9 S. & R. 202, Douglass v. Reynolds, 7 Peters 113.
OPINION OF THE COURT.

The first and most important question
that confronts us in this case is the relationship of the parties. Toits determnination, therefore, we shall devote some discussion. The defendant stands related to
the plaintiff either as a surety or a guar-
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antor. If in the former capacity, then
there is no doubt as to his liability ; but if
in the latter, then a different and more
dubious question presents itself for consideration. In Bouvier's Dictionary,a suretyship is defined as "An undertaking to
answer for the debt, default or miscarriage
of another, by which the surety becomes
bound as principal, or original debtor is
bound." It differs from a guaranty in the
fact that a suretyship is a primary obligation to see that a debt is paid, while a
guaranty is a collateral undertaking, essentially in the alternative to pay the debt if
the debtor does not. 24 Pickering 252.
The difference between suretyship and
guaranty has been expressed as follows:
"A surety isusually bound with his principal by the same instrument, executed at
the same time and on the same consideration. He is the original promisor and
debtor from the beginning, and is held,
ordinarily, to know every default of his
principal. Usually, he will not be discharged either by the mere indulgence of
the creditor, or by want ofnotice of default
of the principal, no matter how much he
may be injured thereby. On the other
hand, the contract of the guarantor is his
own separate undertaking, in which the
principal does not join. It is usually entered into before or after that of the principal, and is often supported on different
consideration than that supporting the
contract of his principal. The original
contract of his principal is not his contract, and he is not bound to take notice of
its non-performance."
Reigart v. White,
52 Pa. 525; Chatham Nat. Bank v. Proll,
135 N. Y. 423.
From an examination of the above principles it is clear that Anthon's contract is
a guaranty. It was made after that of
Mrs. Smith ; it is supported by different
consideration; the principal is not a party
to it; it is collateral to the principal contract; and is an engagement to pay if
the principal does not, thus possessing all
the elements of a guaranty.
Now, we shall proceed to ascertain the
character of the guaranty and the liability
of the guarantor. There are two kinds of
guaranty, absolute and conditional. An
absolute guaranty is an unconditional
promise of payment or performance on default of the principal. A conditional guar-
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anty is when there is some extraneous
event beyond the mere default of the principal by which the guarantor is bound.
The following agreements have been construed as absolute guaranties: "For value
received I hereby guarantee the payment
of within note at maturity." Ford v.
Hendericks, 34 Cal. 673. "For value received we guarantee within note until
paid." City Savings Bank v. Hopson, 53
Conn. 453. These agreements, it will be
observed, contain no provisions. In Ordman v. Lawson, 49 Pa. 135, these words
were said to be a conditional agreement :
"We will pay the note providing you cannot collect it from them." And in Eby v.
Bibb, 4 Ky. 71, these words were also construed as a conditional agreement: "We
guarantee the ultimate payment of within
note."
The distinction between an absolute and
a conditional guaranty is drawn because
the rules of law governing one is different
to the rules of law governing the other.
In a conditional guaranty it is necessary
that the guarantee should give notice of
the default of the non-payment of the
debtor whose debt was guaranteed, unless
it appears that the debtor was insolvent
when the debt was due. Gibbsv. Cannon,
9 S. & R. 202; Follimer v. Dale, 9 Pa. 83.
In an absolute guaranty no such notice is
required. Campbell v. Brook, 46 Pa. 243.
A review of these cases convinces us that
Anthon's guaranty is conditional. Therefore, an examination of the law governing
a conditional guaranty is necessary in
order to ascertain whether or not he can
be held. on that contract.
In 2 Taunt. 202, it was decided that a
guarantor is entitled to notice of default
of the debtor, if the parties to the bill are
not insolvent at the time it was due.
In Gibbs v. Cannon, supra. Duncan,
J., in discussing this point said: "I
think upon a review of these cases the line
is clearly marked. It is this, the guarantor is discharged if notice is not given to
him of non-payment so that he may avail
himself of the want of proper presentment,
and demand due notice of non-payment
if the maker of note, when maker and endorser or either of them is insolvent, at
time note became due. But when insolvent that would be prima facie evidence that a demand upon them and a
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notice to the guarantor would be dispensed with, the presumption being that
the guarantor was not prejudiced by want
of notice."
It does not follow, however, that the
guarantor is discharged from liability on
the guaranty because of failure to give
notice. In order to be discharged from
his liability, he must prove that he actually suffered loss or damage because of
the failure to give notice. Overton v.
Tracey, 14 S. & R. 311; Follum v. Dale,
supra; Page v. Parke, 8 Gray. 211. And
then he is discharged only to the extent of
the damage sustained. Reynolds v. Douglas, 12 Peter 497; Phelton v. Pol, 2 Howard 467. The burden of provingsolvency,
and injury flowing from want of notice
is on the guarantor. Gibbs v. Cannon,
supra. Renolds v. Douglas, supra.
Applying the above principles to the
case, we conclude that the plaintiff must
recover. From the case stated, it appears
that no notice of default was given the

guarantor, and that Mrs. Smith was solvent when the note became due. The
only statement in the case that refers to
her financial condition was that her property was sold by prior lien creditors and
nothing was paid to Knoll. To infer
from that statement that she was insolvent would be unwarranted and injudicious. Neither does it appeai that Anthon, the guarantor, suffered any loss or
damage, because of Knoll's failure to notify him of Mr. Smith's failure' to pay.
As the burden of proving such loss or
damage was upon him and he failed to
prove it, we must presume that no loss
was suffered. Therefore, judgment is entered for the plaintiff for the amount of
the note, $1,000, and interest from the year
WALSt, J.
1891.
OPINION OF THE SUPREME COURT.

Knoll took an assignment from Norris
of a judgment against Smith, payable one
year after the assignment apparently.
Anthon gave to Knoll a paper under seal,
wherein he promised Knoll to pay the
judgment, "at maturity in case the money
was not obtained from Mary Smith."
The money was not obtained from Mary
Smith, and very shortly after it should
have been paid, this action was brought
against Anthon.
It is not important to classify Anthon's

contract, as suretyship or guaranty. We
need simply to know what he promised to
do. Did hepromise to pay the debtifafterits
maturity, executions should prove Smith
insolvent, or if, after maturity he should
be notified of Smith's default, or on any
other contingency than that of the nonpayment at maturity? The perusal of
the contract answers the question. Anthon agreed to pay the money "at maturity " if it was not then paid by Smith.
Instantly on the arrival of January 1st,
1891, it beeane his duty to pay if Smith
did not. This duty he has neglected to
perform. McBeth v. Newlin, 15 W. N.
0. 129; Campbell v. Baker, 46 Pa. 245;
Roberts v. Riddle, 79 Pa. 468; Zahin v.
First National Bank, 103 Pa. 576; Pingrey, Suretyship. p. 3.
The learned court below, having classified the contract as a guaranty, concludes
that notice of non-payment ought to have
been given, but that omission to give it not
b6ing shown to have wrought any injury is
venial. We think that notice was unnecessary. Anthon had promised to pay at maturity, and he was bound to know that
Smith had not paid. The duty to pay was
not contingent on the doing by Knoll of
any act.
Judgment affirmed.
STONE vs. STEESE.
Becord in a criminalcase as evidence in
for conan action of trespass-Trespass
version after conviction of larceny.
STATE

ENT OF THE CASE.

On information of Stone, Steese was
arrested for larceny of four sheep, was
tried, convicted and sentenced to six
months in jail. The indictment charged
Steese with the felonious taking, etc., of
four sheep, the property of Stone. Stone,
subsequent to the discharge of Steese,
brought trespass for the conversion of the
sheep. The witnesses whose testimony
had led to the conviction of Steese, were,
two of them dead and the third had gone
to Australia. Stone relied on the record
in the criminal case to prove the stealing.
Admitted. Verdict and judgment for $40.
JAmES and BERKHOUSE for plaintiff.
The parties in a criminal prosecution
being different from those in a civil action,
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a verdict in a criminal case cannot be used
to establish facts in a civil suit. Jones v.
White, 1 Strange 68; Hutchinson v. Bank,
41 Pa. 42. Betts v. New Hartford, 25 Conn.
185; Mead v. Boston, 3 Cush. 404.
There must be identity of parties in interest to render a record in one case admissible in another. Tear v. West Jersey
Terminal Co., 143 Pa. 122.
CooK and BRUNDAGE for defendant.
Evidence given in a former trial i nvolvIng the same issues, and between the same
parties, is admissible when the witness
cannot be again obtained. 4 S. & R. 203;
81 Pa. 114; 137 Pa. 23; 144 Pa. 126.
OPINION OF THE COURT.

The only question raised in this ease is,
whether or not the court erred in admitting the record of a criminal prosecution
in this subsequent civil proceeding. It
was admitted, however, and it becomes
our duty to examine the various statutes
relating to the rules of evidence in civil
and criminal cases, and from this source to
determine, if possible, whether this record
was properly received. The Act of May
23, 1887, says that a record is admissible
when it is shown that the parties are the
same and the same issues involved. Thus
a record of a criminal action will be competent in a subsequent criminal action,
providing there is identity of parties as
well.
The record alone in this case could have
been properly admitted to prove the fact
that judgment was rendered or the verdict
given against Steese, but could not be
made the entire foundation of the plaintiff's case in the civil action; and since no
evidence was produced whatever upon the
trial of the civil action, judgment was improperly rendered against the plaintiff, if
the record was all that was offered, for
there is a material difference between
proving the existence of a record and using
the record as a medium of proof of the
matters of fact recited in it.
In support of this position we quote Sections 537 and 538, in part, of first volume
of Greenleaf on Evidence: "It is obvious
that, as a general rule, a verdict and judgment in a criminal case cannot be given in
evidence in a civil action to establish the
facts upon which it was rendered. If the
defendant was convicted, it may have been
upon the evidence of the very plaintiff in
the civil action, and if he was acquitted, it
may have been by collusion with the prose-

cutor." "But besides this. and upon more
general grounds, there is no mutuality,
the parties are not the same. The defendant could not avail himself in the criminal
trial of any admissions of the plaintiff in
the civil action; and on the other hand,
the jury in the civil action must decide
upon the mere preponder nce of evidence,
whereas, in order to a criminal conviction,
they must be satisfied of the party's guilt
beyond any reasonable doubt. The same
principles render a judgment in a civil action inadmissible in a criminal prosecution. In the former case the record can
never be considered as res inter alios acta;
the judgment being a public transaction,
rendered by public authority, and being
presumed to be faithfully recorded." The
several cases cited by counsel for and
against the admission of this record are
given in connection with the statement of
facts attached, and a careful examination
of the respective citations has failed to convince us that the record should have been
received. The judgment is set aside and
now judgment is entered for the defendant.
WATSON, J.
OPINION OF THE SUPREMIE COURT.

The action being for the theft of four
sheep, the plaintiff found himself without
witnesses. There had been a prosecution
of Steese for the same theft, at the trial
of which three witnesses had testified for
the commonwealth, and upon their testimony he was convicted. At the trial of
the civil action, the plaintiff, not being
able to produce any of these witnesses,
offered the record of the conviction in evidence. It was received, but, on a motion
for a new trial, the judgment was set
aside, and ultimately a judgment was
entered for the defendant.
A principle is, that a judgment can
estop only those who are parties to the issue in which it is rendered, and, generally,
that when it does not estop, neither is it
evidence against a person. Another principle is that estoppels must be mutual.
One patty to an issue will not be estopped
by an adjudication, unless the other party
is likewise estopped. From the application of these principles, it results that a
conviction of a crime does not estop the
defendant as against any one other than
the commonwealth, and that an acquittal
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estops only the commonwealth as against
the defendant. Hence, an acquittal of X,
of a charge of larceny of A's property is no
bar to a civil suit by A against him for
the conversion of that property. Hutchinson v. Bank of Wheeling, 41 Pa. 44. The
dismissal of a proceeding for surety of the
peace against a husband, begun at the instance of the wife, was no bar to her subsequent libel for divorce on the ground of
cruelty, Breinig v. Breinig, 26 Pa. 161;
Cf. Hahn v. Bealor, 132 Pa. 253. [There
was, however, another objection to the
use of the record.]
The conviction of
Steese, while unimpeachable evidence of
his having stolen the sheep, for the commonwealth, cannot be esteemed decisive
of his guilt in favor of Stone.
But, can Stone use it as evidence, and,
as evidence, would it be sufficient to support a verdict in his favor? The learned
court below has decided negatively. It
cannot, we think, be deemed a settled
question whether a conviction of theft of
A's goods would be prima facie evidence
of that theft in a civil suit by A for the
value of the goods. In Bennett v. Fulmer,
49 Pa. 155, a conviction of the defendant
in ejectment of a forcible entry upon and
detainer of the same premises was excluded, with the approbation of the Supreme Court. "It was between different
parties," says Thompson, J., "and the
plaintiffs were the prosecutors and witnesses." [In Summers v. Bergner, etc.,
Brewing Co., 143 Pa. 114, the action was
for injury to plaintiff's child by the negligent driving of the defendant's driver.
The plaintiff alleged that the driver was
asleep. The defendant offered to show
that the plaintiff had prosecuted the driver
for assault and battery on the child, and
that "at that time there was no contention
on the part of Mr. Summers that the driver
was asleep." For some obscure reason,
this evidence was excluded by the court,
without censure from the Supreme Court].
Although there is probably a preponderance of decision, in favor of the exclusion
of the conviction as even primafacie evidence in a subsequent civil action, there
are cases of the contrary tenor. In Anderson v. Anderson, 4 Me. 100, and Randall
v. Randall, 4 Me. 326, it was held that in
a divorce proceeding, the fact of the marriage between the parties, and the fact of

the respondent's adultery, could be proven
by means of a former conviction of adultery. In Maybee v. Avery, 18 Johns. 352,
an action of slander for charging Maybee
with theft, it was held that Avery could
prove Maybee's conviction of the theft,
because Maybee had had the opportunity
to cross-examine the Commonwealth's witnesses, and because Avery was not one of
these witnesses.
That a conviction is highly persuasive
evidence of guilt is entirely clear. The
common law held it a bar to the convict's
testifying in collateral proceedings plainly
on the theory that it implied guilt, and
guilt implied incredibility. The Act of
June 1, 1891, 1 P. & L. 1635, authorizes
divorce on the ground that the respondent
has been convicted of an infamous crime
and sentenced to a term of imprisonment
exceeding two years. If the State, even
at present, denies to a party the evidence
of one who has been convicted of perjury,
if it will dissolve the marital bond, because
one of the spouses has been convicted of a
serious crime, it mi'st do so on the hypothesis that conviction is sufficient evidence
of guilt to justify important collateral action.
Steese was charged by three witnesses,
with the theft. They were sworn. He
had a chance to cross-examine them. Had
these witnesses been before the court in
the trial of the civil cause, he could have
done no more. In the prosecution, his liberty was at stake, to say nothing of the ineffaceable brand which a sentence would
put upon him. His incentive to sift the
adverse testimony by cross-examination
was greater than in a suit involving but
$40. He had a stronger reason to command such witnesses as could prove an
alibi, or otherwise rebut the evidence of
his guilt, than in the present cause. Nor,
cau it be objected that the evidence of
Stone contributed to the conviction, for
Stone was not a witness. Death has destroyed two of the witnesses, and the third
has gone to Australia. Besides all this,
the bias of a criminal jury is stronger for
the defendant than that of a civil jury on
the same evidence. The former cannot
properly convict without satisfaction of
guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Every
man of the jury is under a duty to acquit,
although he believes the defendant guilty,
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unless that belief reaches a high degree of
constancy and strength. But, in a civil
action, the slightest preponderance requires of him a verdict for the plaintiff,
although the recovery is founded on a
crime. We think,.then, that it would be
expedient to adopt the principle that the
conviction of a crime is prima facie evidence in a civil action which, or the defense against which, is founded on the
same criminal facts.
The husband of a deceased woman, as
tenant by the curtesy, brought ejectment
against her executor, who defended oil the
ground that the plaintiff had deserted his
wife for a year before her death, and so
forfeited his curtesy. The executor put
in evidence the record of a prosecution
against him for desertion, which resulted
in his being sentenced to pay his wife
seven dollars per week. Her death occurred less than four months subsequently.
The Supreme Court approved of the admission of the record as "persuasive, but not
conclusive evidence of a previous desertion
by the husband." Hahn v. Bealor, 132
Pa. 242; Bealor v. Hahn, 117 Pa. 169.
Vide remarks on Bander's Appeal, 115 Pa.
480.
Our attention has been called to no
Pennsylvania case which conflicts with
this unless it be Bennett v. Fulmer, 49 Pa.
155, supra.
It may not be improper to note the fact
that the 179th section of the act of March
31st, 1860, 1 P. & L., 1403, provides that
in addition to other penalties, one convicted of theft shall be adjudged by
the criminal court to restore to the owner
the property taken, or to pay the value of
the same. The sentence, therefore, inures
to the benefit of the owner of the stolen
goods. No plea was made in the court
below, that the sentence of the oyer and
terminer was a former recovery, and as
such barred the civil action. If then the
owner collaterally recovers his goods or
their value, in the prosecution, we see no
grave objection to his using the conviction
in support of a civil action for the property stolen, if for any sufficient reason,
he feels impelled to resort to one.
Judgment reversed with v. f. d. n.

191

ALLEN vs. TRIPP.
Covenant of general warranty- When
covenantee'sgranteemay sue.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE.

Tripp, owning land, except the coal
under the surface which had been conveyed away, conveyed to Lloyd by metes
and bounds, not excepting the coal, with
covenant of general warranty. Lloyd
knew that the coal had been previously
conveyed and that it was not the intention
of Tripp to effect to convey to Lloyd the
coal.
Lloyd in turn conveyed to Jackson,
making no exception of the coal, but giving no warranty. Jackson supposed that
lie was getting and that Lloyd was intending that he should understand that
he was getting the coal. Jackson subsequently conveyed the tract to Allen with
general warranty. Allen discovered that
0. Holmes was the owner of the coal and
was mining it from a mine opening into
next tract. This is an action on Tripp's
covenant.
YEAGLEY and WILSON for plaintiff.

Cited 46 Pa. 233; 68 Pa. 400; 141 Pa.
312; 135 Pa. 411.
HURGUS for defendant.
Cited 107 Pa. 408; 24 N. J. Eq. 206 ; 117
Pa. 67; 147 Pa. 562.

OPINION OF THE COURT.
The case stated is as follows: Tripp
received title to a tract of land, described
by metes and bounds, with a reservation
of all the coal underlying the tract.
The validity of such a conveyance, with
a reservation, cannot be denied. The cases
are too numerous to cite when mineral
and timber rights have been reserved in
the vendor and disposition made of everything else.
Tripp then conveyed to Lloyd, describing the land by metes and bounds, without any reservation, and gives Lloyd a
general warranty of title and possession.
Lloyd knew, when lie took the conveyauce from Tripp, that Tripp had no title to
the underlying coal and knew, too, that
Tripp did not intend to convey the coal to
him.
Lloyd then conveyed to Jackson without reserving the coal, but giving no warranty, but Jackson supposed he was buy-
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ing the coal with the land, and that Lloyd
intended that Jackson should believe he
was purchasing the coal, and would get it.
Jackson afterward conveyed to Allen with
a general warranty, presumably with no
reservation in the deed, and without
knowledge on Allen's part that anyone
else had a right to the coal. After Allen
had received the conveyance he discovered
that Holmes was the owner of the coal,
and was mining it by a shaft opening into
al adjacent tract. Allen sues Tripp on his
covenant of warranty.
The question is, can he recover, and if
so, what?
The case is somewhat involved by reason
of the knowledge of two of the persons in
the chain of title of the reservation of the
coal, and by reason of there being rb warranty in Lloyd's deed to Jackson.
We do not see that these facts materially
affect the decision of this case. Tripp gives
a general warranty to Lloyd, which, on
account of Lloyd's knowledge of an outstanding title to the coal, is worthless to
Lloyd as against damage done by mining
the coal by the lawful owner.
Then Lloyd conveyed to Jackson without warranty. Then Jackson-cnveyed to
Allen, who has no knowledge, and gives
Allen ageneralwarranty. Allen supposes
he is the owner of the coal, and has made
his investment with that belief, and perhal)s by reason of it. He is evicted from
the coal by a person who claims it lawfully. He certainly has a remedy. The
question is, can he sue Tripp on the general warranty in his. deed to Lloyd?
A general warranty in a Pennsylvania
deed is a covenant to defend the purchaser,
his heirs and assigns, against damage from
all persons lawfully claiming or to claim
theland in question. The cages are numerous on this point.
It is plain to be seen that there was an
eviction by the mining of the coal, also a
breach of warranty. 164 Pa. 115 ; 14 Pa.
336; 3 S. &. R. 407. A covenant of warranty runs with the land. 3 P. & W. 313.
We can see no escape by Tripp from
liability under the facts stated, and therefore direct the jury to find a verdict for
Allen, and assess as damages the loss actually sustained by Allen by reason of
Holmes mining the coal. Beauplan v.
McKeen, 28 Pa. 124.
CoNRY, J

OPINION OF THE SUPREME COURT.

In Pennsylvania, doubtless it could be
shown, were the action by Lloyd upon
Tripp's covenant, that Lloyd knew when
he accepted the conveyance from Tripp
that Tripp did not own the coal and was
not undertaking to convey it, and Lloyd
could not treat the subsequent eviction
from the coal as a breach of the warranty.
Stafford v. Giles, 136 Pa. 411.
The warranty is made to run with the
land. Allen knew that it bad this property. He knew that Lloyd's guarantee of
the land would interpret the written warranty without the aid of the facts that
were known to Lloyd himself. We think
these facts could not be proven against
Allen, in the absence of proof that he was
aware of them before he bought the land
from Lloyd. Suydam v. Jones, 10 Wend.
181. Had the warranty originally been
applicable to the coal, Lloyd might have
released it wbile still the owner of the
land. Such release, if unknown to Allen,
would, we think, have been inoperative
as against him. Brown v. Staples, 28 Me.
503, although a different opinion is expressed in Martin v. Gordon, 24 Ga. 536.
We agree, therefore, with thelearnedcotirt
below in the conclusion that the interpretation of the covenant, which, as concerns
Lloyd and Tripp, would be admissible, is
inadmissible as concerns Tripp and Allen.
But, Allen cannot maintain a suit on
Tripp's covenant of warranty unless that
covenant ran with the land. It ordinarily
thus runs with the land. There are cases,
however, which hold that it does not Tun
unless the covenantor had a title to the
land, at least the title which consists of
possession, or seisin. Moore v. Merrill, 17
N. H. 75; Hacker v. Stover, 8 Me. 228;
Burtnoes v. Keran, 24 Gratt. 42 - Beddde
v. Wadsworth, 21 Wend. 120 (Cf. Mygatt
v. Coe, 142 N. Y. 78.) "If the grantor has
no title and is not seised of the land when
I he makes his deed ofconveyance, his covenant of warranty does not attach to the
land and run with it, and he therefore is
not liable to an action by an assignee of
his grantee for the breach of such covenant" 8 Am. & Eng. Encyc. 149.
There was a title to, and a seisin of, a
part of the land embraced in the description of the deed. There were none, as to
the coal, which was another part of that
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land. In Slater v. Rawson, 1 Mete. 450,
the grantor, while seised of much the
larger part of the land conveyed, had no
seisin or ownership of about 22 acres embraced in the deed. It was held that the
grantee of his grantee could not maintain
an action on the warranty for a subsequent
eviction from these 22 acres. Cf. Slater v.
Rawson, 6 Mete. 439. In Moore v. Merrill, 17 N. H. 75, A conveyed with warranty to B three undivided fourths of a
trat, and B aft erwards conveyed to 0, and
C to D. D theii conveyed, with warranty
to A. A had, at the time of his conveyance to B, only an undivided half. He
brought an action against D on his covenant, and it was held that D's right to defalk A's liability on his covenant to B depended on the seisin or want of seisin of A,
at the time of his conveyance, of the onefourth, the eviction from which was the
occasion of the action. If the principle of
these cases is sound (and we are aware of
nothing in the decisions of this State, that
is inconsistent with it), it follows that
Tripp's covenant, as respects the coal, did
not run with the land, and that Allen can
sustain no action upon it.
It is to be regretted that the investigation of the learned court bf-low was not
more extensive, and that the extremely
interesting and important questions involved in the case did not compel a more
searching study of the authorities.
Judgment reversed.
HENRY vs. DAVIS.
Trespassfor cutting timber- What constitutes possession-Public and private
ways distinguished-Grantee's interest
in way depends on boundary line-Burden of proof on defendant toajustify the
trespass-Act of March 29, 1824, P. & L.
Digest, p. 4707.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE.

William Henry has been the owner in
fee for thirty-seven years of a lot of ground
in the village of Hall. The deed to this
lot calls for an alley t welve feet wide on
the east side. John Davis is the owner in
fee of a lot of ground east of that owned by
Henry. His deed calls for an alley twelve
feet wide on the west side.
The village of Hall is unincorporated.
The streets and alleys are all marked in
the original plan of the village. Thealley
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above referred to has never been opened ;
it is and always has been enclosed in the
lot owned by Henry.
A fence divides the alley from the lot of
Davis. This fence is kept in repair by
both of the parties. A number of locust
trees, about six inches in diameter, stand
in the alley, which is enclosed in the lot of
Henry, at a distance of eight inches from
the fence and the lot of Davis. Davis,
standing on his land, cut down two of the
trees. Henry claims that he is owner of
the land on which the trees have been cut,
and is therefore entitled to damages. Can
he recover?
CANNON and KLINE for plaintiff.
A continuous adverse possession for
twenty-one years gives a title to land,
which is valid not only by way of defense,
but sufficient to recover upon in ejectment.
Pederick v. Searle, 5 S. & R. 241; McCall
v. Neely, 3 Watts 73.
The possession may be adverse by enclosure of the land without residing on it.
Johnson v. Irwin, 3 S. & R. 291.
EBBE3RT and SCHNBE for defendant.
A person's title is not affected by nonuser. Weaver v. Getz, 16 Superior 418;
Lindeman v. Lindsey, 69 Pa. 93.
The entry upon a lane by one, whose
deed called for boundaries embracing lane,
and holding for twenty-oneyears, will not
bar right of way of owner of lane. Bombaugh v. Miller, 82 Pa. 203.
OPINION OF THE COURT.

The question which presents itself for
our consideration is, whether the defendant has been guilty of a breach of duty to
the plaintiff by cutting the trees. The
facts do not inform us as to whether the
alley upon which the trees stood was a
public or private one, and we will, therefore, consider the rights of the parties,
firstly, by regarding it as a public, and,
secondly, as a private alley.
When a parcel of land is granted, and a
street or road is named as a boundary, the
grantee takes title to the middle of the
street, if the grantor had title to the middle. Paul v. Carver, 26 Pa. 223. However, an exception to this rule is recognized, and when the street which is named
as the boundary is not yet opened, the
grantee takes title only up to his line, the
title to the street remaining in the grantor
until it is opened. The grantee only acquires title to the street when itis opened,
before which he has an easement over it.
Hancock v. Phila., 175 Pa. 124; Cole v.
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Phila., 194 Pa.464. The alley bpinga public highway, and unopened, the paper
title to it is in neither of the parties to this
action; they merely have an easement over
the bed of it. The plaintiff, however, is in
possession of the whole alley, and his possession in itself is a sufficient title upon
which to maintain trespass agaiist all
who disturb him in his possession, the
owner and all who have a better title excepted. 2 Blackstone Comm. 196; .3 Washburn on Real Prop. 114; Graham v. Peat,
1 East 244; Slater v. Rawson, 6 Metcalf
445; Lund v. Parker, 3 N. H. 50. Blackstone, speaking of possession as a species
of title, says: "Till some act be done by the
rightful owner to divest this possession
and assert his title, such actual isprima
facie evidence of a legal title in the 15ossessor." " Any possession is a legal possession agains, a wrong-doer," per Lord
Kenyon, in Graham v. Peat, supra. In
an action of trespass the defendant can
never plead title in a third party without
alleging a rightderived from him; because
a party having actual possession, but not
the right of possession, has a good title
against a party having none. Although
the defendant's deed gave him an easement over the locus in quo, cutting timber
or exercising any acts of ownership besides passingover the land are tortious, for
which trespass will lie to the party injured. Sanderson v. Haverstick, 8 Pa.
294.
Under the above case, knowlwas on the land of
edge that it
immaterial.
another was considered
See O'Reilly v. Shadle, 33 Pa. 489. We
see no reason why distinction should
be drawn between the case of Hancock v. Phila., supra, from the mere fact
that the locus in quo was a street, whereas
in the case at bar it is merely a public
highway or alley. Even if the plaintiff
and defendant took title to the middle of
the alley under their deeds, theformer has
acquired, under the statute of limitations,
a title to the whole, which the holder of
the paper title cannot dispute. His title.
however, is subject to the public's easenient and right of use and enjoyment, as
no private occupancy of a public highway
for whatever time, either adverse or permissive, vests a title inconsistent with the
public use. Phila. v. Railroad Co., 58 Pa.
253; Com. v. Moore, 113 Pa. 344. The de-

fendant's property in the half of the alley
is private property, and being such can be
lost by adverse possession. The owner of
land does not lose his right of entry, unless there has been an actual, continued,
visible, notorious, distinct and hostile possession for twenty-one years.
The possession of the plaintiff has all
these characteristics. The only one as to
which any doubt can exist is the last, that
is,the mark of hostility. Justice Rogers in
Rung v. Shoneberger said: "Ifa person
enters into possession of land of another
and holds it, without more, the presumption is, he claims title. A possession
under such circumstances would be adverse, and as such would give title." The
law as it exists in Pennsylvania has been
stated as follows: " Adverse possession is
a possession inconsistent with the rights
of the true owner, in other words where a
person possesqses property in a manner in
which he is not entitled to possess it and
without anything to show that he possesses it otherwise than as owner, that is
without the intention of excluding all
persons from using It, including the rightful owner, he is in adverse possession."
See Sheaffer v. Eakman, 56 Pa.
In the language of Mr. Justice Gibson,
approved of in Olewine v. Messmore, 128
Pa. 470. "The claimant must keep his
flag flying and present a hostile front to
The case of
all adverse pretentions."
Sorkin v, Sentman, 162 Pa. 543, is strikingly similar in many respects to the one
at bar. The plaintiff and defendant were
adjoining property owners, a house being
built on each lot by a former owner. The
plaintiff and his predecessors in title for
thirty-seven years had exclusive and continuous possession of a space above and
below the defendant's side hall, which
space, in fact, was part of the defendant's
house and to which he had a paper title,
but nevertheless, the court sitting in
equity, held that the defendant had lost
all rights to the space and that the
plaintiff had acquired a good title under
the statute. Under the authorities we
have come to the conclusion that the
plaiotiff's title under the statute is complete.
If the alley was public as assumed, the plaintiff is entitled to recover.
Considering it as a private way the
parties took title to the centre. By force
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of his possession for the reasons above
given, the plaintiff has acquired
a
title under the statute of limitations,
which the defendant, after remaining inactive for so long a time, is precluded from
contesting. The facts being undisputed,
the question of adverse possession is for
the court. Rung v. Shoneberger, supra.
It is no defense to the plaintiff's action
that the trespass was committed by the
defendant while standing on his own
land. It has been held to fire a gun into
another's field is a trespass quare clausum
fregit. Whether the alley is public or
private the plaintiff is entitled to recover.
Under the act of March 29, ]824, P. L.
152, section 3, the plaintiff is entitled to
doulle the value of the trees.
Judgment for plaintiff.
GERBER, J.
OPINION OF THE SUPREME COURT.
This action of trespass presupposes that
Henry was in possession of the locus in
quo the trees stood, and were cut down,
and that Davis had no better right to the
possession of it than Henry.
For thirty-seven years the alley has
been enclosed with Henry's lot. Possession is manifested by various acts, by cultivation, by enclosure, by residence, etc.
The erection of a fence and its inaintenance for thirty-seven years, are very significant acts of possession. The first condition of the right to maintain trespass is,
hence, fulfilled.
Had Davis a better right to the possession than Henry ? We are informed that
the deed under which Davis claims," calls
for an alley twelve feet wide on the west
side." This alley is in an incorporated
village. It has never been opened. It was,
therefore, not a public, but a private way,
if a way at all. When such a way is called
for as a boundary in a deed, the grantee
takes no part of the way in fee, but only a
right of passage over it. Spackman v.
Steidle, 88 Pa. 453; Robinson v. Myers,
67 Pa. I ; Ensign v. Lyon, 1 Lack. Jur. 102;
4 P. & L. Dig. 6632.
Whether Davis's grantor owned the fee
of the alley does not appear. If he did
not, the fee in it could, it is hardly necessary to say, not pass to Davis. It does
not appear whether the alley, or the side
of the alley was called for as a boundary. If
the latter, Davis would not be the owner
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in fee of a half of it, but would have only
an easement of passage over it, even were
it a public way, until it was actually
opened. Gamble v. Philadelphia, 162 Pa.
413, Whitaker v. Phoenixville, 141 Pa. 327,
Wayne Avenue, 124 Pa. 135, Hancock v.
Philadelphia, 175 Pa. 124, Cole v. Philadelphia, 199 Pa. 464. It has never been
opened.
The right of way, however, would entitle Davis to enter on the way, not only
for passage, but for the removal of obstacles to passage, and if trees so stood in
the way as to impede its use he would
have a right to cut them down. Quintard v. Bishop, 29 Conn. 366; Dickinson
V. Whiting, 141 Mass. 414; Gordon v.
Taunton, 126 Mass. 349. Cf. Hartman v.
Fick. 167 Pa. 18; Dyer v. Depui, 5 Wh.
584. It does not appear that the trees
were an obstruction. They stood within
eight inches of the Davis fence, and the
alley was twelve feet in width. At all
events, the burden was on Davis to justify
what was an apparent trespass on the
possession of Henry. Proving that he
had a right of way, of itself, was no justification. Shspending gates at the exit of
a way, is not ipso facto, an actionable obstruction, Connery v. Brooke, 73 Pa. 80;
Demuth v. Anuvez, 90 Pa. 181; and other
objects may be within the boundaries of the
way, without impeding its actual use.
Whatever right Davis may have had in
the alley, has long since become extinct.
The alley has been enclosed by Henry for
thirty-seven years. During that time
there has been a fence separating Davis'
land from it, and preventing his walking
or driving upon it from his lot. The ends
of the alley have also been obstructed, not
by gates, so far as appears, but by an immovable fence. During thirty-seven years
a visible obstacle to the use of the way by
Davis has existed, and he has even kept
the fence in repair which prevented his
getting upon the alley. At the time of
the cutting of the trees, he had no right of
way, Spackman v. Steidel, 88 Pa. 453, and
the act was a trespass, for which the damages recovered below were only a just
compensation.
Judgment affirmed.
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TEMPLE vs. FARMERS' BANK.
jecetment-Omission in seirefaciasof one
pieceo.f property embracedin mortgage
-Right to issue subsequent sirefaiasEstoppel.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE.

The bank took a mortgage for $2,500 on
a town lot and farm. On a judgment on
the mortgage a sale was had on the farm
for $1,000. The sci.fa. did not mention
the lot.
Temple, about to lend $200 to Philips on
judgment, asked the teller of the bank
what was due on the mortgage. He
referred to a book kept by the bank in
which was a record of mortgages and judgments, and findingthat the mortgage from
Philips was satisfied, showed the record to
Temple. The record had been in the bank
four months, during which time there had
been fourteen meetings of the directors, at
which the book had been present and examined for sundry purposes. Thereupon,
Temple lent $200 to Philips, taking a judgment. He later issued execution, levied
on the town lot, which was sold for $700,
he being the purchaser. He was notified
by the bank's agent before he bought that
its mortgage was unpaid, and was a lien
on the land. Subsequently the bank took
possession of the lot. The sheriff, after
accepting the receipt of Temple for $200,
required him to pay the rest of his bid.
The balance, after deducting costs, viz.:
$433, was paid to Philips as owner. This
is ejectment.
BROOKS and MINNICH for plaintiff.
The bank is estopped by act of its agent.
Gray's Appeal, 10 W. N. 0. 458; Buchanan
v. Moore, 13 S. & R. 304; City of Philadelphia v. Matchett, 116 Pa. 103; 93 Pa. 376.
To maintain ejectment plaintiff must show
present right of possession. 32 Pa. 376.
STERRETT and RHODES, F. for defendant.
Omission by mistake in seire facias of
one of properties embraced in mortgage
does not discharge the lien of mortgage on
the one omitted so as to give priority to
subsequent creditor. Miller's Appeal, 11
W. N. C. 506; Evans v. Jones, 1 Yeates 172.
OPINION OF THE COURT.

The questions before us for determination are : Had the plaintiff the right to
rely on the bank's record of the court
records? Was he not negligent in failing
to consult the proper records?
The Act of May 28,1815, requires the re-

cording of mortgages and deeds. Its very
object and aim was to prevent and protect
such acts, and the parties thereto, as the
case before us involves.
Its object is to protect subsequent mortgages against previous mortgages. The
courts, by construction, make the record
of a mortgage notice to any subsequent
mortgagees or lien creditors of the existence
of the prior lien. This rule has been well
settled in Lightner v. Mooney, 10 Watts
407, also in Evans v. Jones, I Yeates 172,
and has been followed in all the later cases.
Secondly, the defendants allege that the
bank is estopped from denying the representations made by the teller of the bank.
There is no evidence that the bank gave
any instructions to the teller to represent
that their record was a certified copy of
the court records; neither they, nor their
agent, guaranteed its accuracy. It was for
reference merely. We have no evidence that
the bank transacted any business on the
strength of this record. Further, thata mere
announcement (as the bank's record was)
of what is already open to the inspection
of the public cannot operate as an estoppel,
has been held in Williams v. Mullan, I
Pittsburg L. J. 337; and, on the other
hand, under these circumstances, an
estoppel can only be claimed by one who
has not only acted in ignorance of the true
state of facts, but who is also without any
means of informing himself of their existence. Cuttle v. Brockway, 32 Pa. 45.
Further, the plaintiff was thepurehaser
at the sheriff's sale, and upon his title,
thereby acquired, he relies to bring this action. The bank did not take possession of
the town lot until after he had purchased
at the sheriff's sale, when they took possession. Why, then, does he bring this
action against the bank and not Philips,
who was undoubtedly in possession at the
time of the sheriff's sale? In Yost v.
Brown, 5 Kulp 111, the rule laid down is,
that "if the plaintiff relies solely upon his
title acquired by purchase at a sheriff's
sale, he must prove defendant's possession
at the time of the levy and sale." The
plaintiff, therefore, relying on his title thus
acquired, should have brought his action
against Philips and defendant bank. Judgment is therefore entered for defendant.
TURNER, J.
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OPINION OF THE SUPREME COURT.

The scire facias issued on the Philips
mortgage mentioned only the farm, and
not the lot, both of which were embraced
in the mortgage. The judgment followed
the sci. fa., and the levari facias both.
The farm accordingly was sold, but not the
lot. Was the mortgage merged in the
judgment, or did the recovery of ajudgment against the farm, and a Sale of the
farm, destroy the right to enforce the mortgage as to the lot? It has been said that
a bill to foreclose a mortgage must apply
to all the premises mortgaged, because,
otherwise, the defendant would be subjected to an unnecessary number of suits.
Cooper's Equity, 184; Milford's Eq. Pleading, 183; 9 Encyc. P1. & Pr. 875. It is
evident that if the mortgagee can issue a
scirefaciasto foreclose one piece of land
to-day, and another to-morrow, andathird
on the third day, he might oppress his
debtor with costs. In the case before us
the premises were distinct and separate
before the mortgage was made. It does
not appear that the omission of the lot
from the sci. fa. was on the part of the
mortgagee intentional, or, indeed, that he
in anyway, caused it. It may be presumed
that the prmcipe indicated the book and
page in the Recorder's office where the
mortgage might be found, and that, as
usual, the prothonotary framed the scire
faciasfrom the mortgage, without collaboration of the mortgagee. The latter does
not therefore lose the right to enforce the
mortgage against the lot, either by taking
the proceeds, should it be sold on an earlier
lien-Miller's Appeal, 11 W. N. C. 506, or
by issuing a second scirefacias,or by taking possession of the lot.
After the sale of the farm, Philips confessed a judgment to Temple for $200 then
lent to him. On this judgment a sale of
the lot was made for $700, to Temple. The
mortgage, still on the lot, was the first
lien, and was not divested by the sale to
Temple. The Farmers' Bank, as mortgagee, had a right to take possession, by
ejectment or without, and apply the rents
to its debt. Being thus in possession, Temple could not eject it until the mortgage
debt had been repaid. But it was not necessary that the debt should have been repaid, at the institution of the suit. The
bank had been in possession-how long

does not appear-and it was its duty to
account for the rents received by it. It
follows that. this account should have been
taken, at the trial, and that the verdict
should have been in favor of Temple, conditioned upon his paying the balance of
the debt, ascertained by the jury to be due,
in some reasonably short time-1 Liens
177; 3 Liens 182; but, as he does not allege
payments since the sale on the levarifacias, and furnishes no evidence of the
length of the defendant's possession, nor
of the rental value of the land, it was not
error to suffer an unconditional verdict for
the defendant, if the plaintiff has no other
reason for recovering. Levick v. Bensing,
1 Mona. 592.
Temple alleges, as reason for his recovering, that, although the mortgage was not,
as to Philips, discharged from the lot, it
was discharged as to him, Temple, by estoppel of the Bank against asserting it
About to lend $200, Temple inquired ot
the teller of the bank what was due upon
its mortgage. The functions of the teller
do not include that of giving such information. Zane, Banks and Banking, p. 155.
The teller produced a book kept by the
bank, in which was a record of its mortgages and judgments, and a statement
that the Philips mortgage was satisfied.
The teller showed this record to Temple,
who, thereupon, lent $200, taking a judgment from Philips. Is the bank estopped
from these facts? The record was kept by
the bank for its own convenience, and not
for the purpose of being inspected by
strangers. Nor is there any evidence that
it was in the custody of the teller, or that
he was authorized to exhibit it to anybody. Had Temple applied to the directors, or possibly, to the cashier, and received the same information, the bank
would probably have been estopped, since
the circumstances indicated that Temple
was intending to act on it. But we are
unable to see how the teller, without authority additional to that which he ordinarily possesses, can destroy the property
of the bank not put in his care by creating estoppels for it.
The book containing the record of the
Philips mortgage and of its satisfaction,
had been in the bank four months, and
during this time it had been before the
directors at fourteen meetings. It does
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not appear that, at these meetings, they
had noticed this particular entry, but if it
did, and if therefore the entry might be
regarded as their admission that their
mortgage had been satisfied, it is an admission not made to Temple, still less
made to him in order that he might act
upon the assumption of its truth. Until
it is shown that the book was kept in order
that the teller might show it to inquirers,
the fact that he showed it can in no wise
prejudice the bank.

While we reach the conclusion that the
judgment of the learned court below must
be sustained, we do not quite agree with it
as to the route by which it arrived at Its
decision. The principle cited from Yost v.
Brown, 5 Kulp 111, is irrelevant. If
Temple has a right to the possession, he
may sustain an ejectment against any who
is depriving him of it. Philips is not depriving him of it, the defendant is.
Judgment affirmed.
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